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INTRODUCTION 
Bankruptcy filings are on the rise yet again.1  The recent economic 
downturn has led to many sources of financial distress, including the 
rise in unemployment, increase in the number of uninsured people, 
mortgage and foreclosure crises, and tightening of consumer credit.2  
Debtors facing these difficult situations may have no other option but 
to turn to the last resort of filing for bankruptcy to obtain a “fresh 
start.”3 
                                                 
 1. See Press Release, American Bankruptcy Institute, Consumer Bankruptcy 
Filings Surge Past One Million During First Nine Months of 2009 (Oct. 2,  
2009), available at http://www.abiworld.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home& 
TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=58852 (noting that at the 
end of September 2009, consumer bankruptcies totaled 1,046,449 filings, the first 
time since 2005 that bankruptcy filings have exceeded one million during the first 
three quarters of the year).  See generally Jon P. Nelson, Consumer Bankruptcy and 
Chapter Choice:  State Panel Evidence, 17 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 552 (1999) (examining 
the rise in bankruptcy cases from 1985 to 1996 and the impact of the bankruptcy laws 
on bankruptcy decisions). 
 2. See Hibah Yousuf, Personal Bankruptcies Hits a 4-Year High, CNNMONEY.COM, 
Oct. 2, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/10/02/news/economy/consumer_ 
bankruptcy/?postversion=2009100217 (noting that the unemployment rate has 
climbed to 9.8 percent in September 2009 and that 37.6 percent of consumers who 
filed for bankruptcy attributed it to job loss).  See generally Thomas Evans & Paul B. 
Lewis, Bankruptcy Reform and the Foreclosure Crisis, 28 BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP. 
1 (2009) (examining the relationship between the number of foreclosures and 
bankruptcy filings). 
 3. See Lauren E. Tribble, Judicial Discretion and the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention Act, 
57 DUKE L.J. 789, 793–94 (2007) (noting that Chapter 7 bankruptcy has always been 
intended to give the debtor a fresh start, without which “people who never expected 
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Just four years ago, a startling 2,078,415 bankruptcy petitions were 
filed,4 and in response to this thirty percent skyrocket in filings, 
Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act (“BAPCPA”).5  Through the BAPCPA, Congress 
attempted to relieve the growing concerns that the existing 
limitations of the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) were insufficient to 
prevent debtors from filing opportunistic bankruptcy petitions 
despite having sufficient funds to pay at least a part of their 
outstanding debt.6  Nevertheless, although a “mere” 617,660 petitions 
were filed in 2006,7 the upsurge has resumed—if not accelerated—
over the past few years, which may be attributable in part to the worst 
economic crisis the United States has suffered since the Great 
Depression.8  As annual filings increased thirty-five percent (from 
967,831 filings in 2008 to 1,306,315 filings in 2009),9 the pressure on 
                                                 
or intended to incur debt might be forced to spend their lives working to pay their 
creditors, never able to take home their own pay” (citing 151 CONG. REC. S1836 
(daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Kennedy))). 
 4. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Table F-2, U.S. Bankruptcy 
Courts, Business and Nonbusiness Bankruptcy Cases Commenced, by Chapter of the 
Bankruptcy Code, During the Twelve Month Period Ending Dec. 31, 2005, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/bnkrpctystats/bankrupt_f2table_dec2005.xls. 
 5. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. 
No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of  
11 U.S.C.). 
 6. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 5 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 
92 (stating that a “factor motivating comprehensive reform is that the present 
bankruptcy system has loopholes and incentives that allow and—sometimes—even 
encourage opportunistic personal filings and abuse”); President George W. Bush, 
Remarks at the Signing of Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (Apr. 20, 
2005), available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2889/is_16_41/ai_n 
13777502 (“In recent years, too many people have abused the bankruptcy laws.  
They’ve walked away from debts even when they had the ability to repay them . . . .  
Under the new law, Americans who have the ability to pay will be required to pay 
back at least a portion of their debts.”). 
 7. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Table F-2, Business and 
Nonbusiness Bankruptcy Cases Commenced, by Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, 
During the Twelve Month Period Ending Dec. 31, 2006, http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
bnkrpctystats/bankrupt_f2table_dec2006.xls. 
 8. See The 2009 Bankruptcy Judgeship Recommendations of the Judicial Conference of the 
United States:  Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 2–3 (2009) (testimony of J. Barbara M. G. Lynn, Chair, 
Judicial Conference Comm. on the Administration of the Bankruptcy System) 
(noting the record number of petitions that continue to be filed due to the 
economic situation).  See generally Robert M. Lawless et al., Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail?  
An Empirical Study of Consumer Debtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349 (2008) (reviewing data 
collected in the 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project to analyze the effects of the 
BAPCPA on the rate of bankruptcy filings and finding that the BAPCPA has not 
prevented “can-pay” debtors from using the bankruptcy system but instead may have 
discouraged debtors who are in need of relief from filing for bankruptcy). 
 9. See Press Release, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 
Bankruptcy Filings Continue to Rise in June (Aug. 13, 2009), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/2009/BankruptcyFilingsJun2009.cfm 
(emphasizing the drastic increase in the total number of filings in all bankruptcy 
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judges to clear their dockets by disposing of bankruptcy cases as 
quickly as possible has only heightened.10 
The BAPCPA’s failure to slow the increase in bankruptcy filings has 
led judges to look elsewhere for means to alleviate their caseload.11  
One method in particular that judges have seized upon is dismissing 
petitions on the grounds of bad faith under § 707(a) of the Code.12  
Under § 707(a), a case may be dismissed “for cause” if the debtor fails 
to satisfy a technical or procedural requirement such as paying the 
filing fee.13  Its counterpart, § 707(b), calls for a subjective inquiry 
into the facts and circumstances of the case to determine whether the 
debtor filed in bad faith (“bad faith inquiry”).14  Although § 707(a) 
remains silent as to bad faith, under the guise of judicial discretion, 
courts have inserted subjective factors—including the debtor’s intent 
and financial situation—into the court’s objective analysis of whether 
“cause” exists to justify dismissal.15 
                                                 
chapter filings in the twelve month periods ending on June 30, 2008 and June 30, 
2009, respectively).  In the twelve month period ending on June 30, 2009, Chapter 7 
filings totaled 907,603, which was a forty-seven percent increase from the previous 
twelve month period ending on June 30, 2008.  Id. 
 10. The 2009 Bankruptcy Judgeship Recommendations of the Judicial Conference of the 
United States:  Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 2–3 (June 16, 2009) (testimony of J. Barbara M. G. Lynn, 
Chair, Judicial Conference Comm. on the Administration of the Bankruptcy System) 
(petitioning for immediate appointments of bankruptcy judgeships to alleviate 
docket pressures and ensure efficient operation of the bankruptcy system, especially 
in light of the record number of petitions that continue to be filed due to the 
economic situation). 
 11. See id. at 7 (“An overburdened court may use several strategies to temporarily 
alleviate the caseload burden, such as streamlined case management procedures, assistance 
from other bankruptcy courts, recalled judges, expansion of automation programs, or 
addition of more support personnel.” (emphasis added) (internal footnote 
omitted)). 
 12. E.g., Tamecki v. Frank (In re Tamecki), 229 F.3d 205, 207 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(dismissing the debtor’s Chapter 7 case because the debtor lacked good faith in 
filing for bankruptcy); Indus. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Zick (In re Zick), 931 F.2d 1124, 1129 
(6th Cir. 1991) (same). 
 13. 11 U.S.C. § 707(a) (2006). 
 14. Id. § 707(b). 
 15. See, e.g., In re O’Brien, 328 B.R. 669, 675 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2005) (applying a 
fourteen-factor test to make the same inquiry); In re Griffieth, 209 B.R. 823, 827 
(Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1996) (applying a six-factor test to determine whether the filing was 
done in bad faith); see also David S. Kennedy, Treatment of Bad Faith and Abusive Filings 
in Individual Bankruptcy Cases and Related Matters, 9 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 391, 397–98 
(2000) (categorizing the divergent definitions of bad faith created by courts under 
§ 707(a)); Katie Thein Kimlinger & William P. Wassweiler, The Good Faith Fable of  
11 U.S.C. § 707(a):  How Bankruptcy Courts Have Invented a Good Faith Filing Requirement 
for Chapter 7 Debtors, 13 BANKR. DEV. J. 61, 66–68 (1996) (arguing that the judge-made 
good faith filing requirement is an abuse of judicial discretion that is unsupported by 
the text or purpose of the Code and has been improperly applied by a multitude of 
courts, many of which consider the “worthiness” of the debtor to decide whether or 
not to dismiss the case). 
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This misinterpretation frustrates the intent of Congress, which has 
clearly distinguished the analyses under each subsection.16  The bad 
faith inquiry goes beyond the objective scope of § 707(a)17 and is not 
only duplicative but also constitutes a complete disregard of the other 
provisions of the Code that also afford protections to creditors and 
trustees.18  Additionally, it ignores the BAPCPA, through which 
Congress increased the objectivity of the Code largely to constrain 
judicial discretion.19  In short, though courts have understandably felt 
the pressure to quickly dispose of cases, bad faith dismissals under 
§ 707(a) find no support in the statutory text, purpose, or legislative 
history of the Code and thus debtors should not be denied access to 
bankruptcy relief under this flawed application of § 707(a). 
Suppose a debtor who has been living a lavish lifestyle and 
incurring heavy credit card debt undergoes an unforeseen and very 
costly medical procedure but has just been laid off from work.  He is 
left with no means to cover his expenses and no choice but to file for 
bankruptcy.  Should the court completely deny him a “fresh start” by 
dismissing his bankruptcy petition because he previously engaged in 
abusive credit card activity? 
Many courts have dismissed such bankruptcy petitions under 
§ 707(a) on the grounds that the debtor filed in “bad faith.”20  In so 
                                                 
 16. See Kimlinger & Wassweiler, supra note 15, at 90 (noting that, while the 
analysis under § 707(a) looks to the technical and procedural requirements of 
bankruptcy filings, a good faith inquiry requires a factual analysis into the presence 
of “any abuses of the provisions, purpose, or spirit of the bankruptcy law and into 
whether the debtor honestly requires the liberal protection of the Bankruptcy Code” 
(quoting In re Bingham, 68 B.R. 933, 935 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1987))). 
 17. See id. at 63–71 (arguing that the absence of an explicit good faith filing 
requirement supports the rejection of bad faith dismissals under § 707(a)); see also 
infra Part II.A (arguing that the statutory text of § 707(a) provides no support for bad 
faith dismissals under that subsection). 
 18. See infra Part II.B (discussing the other provisions contained in the Code that 
protect the integrity of the bankruptcy system).  For example, § 523 exempts certain 
debts from discharge and § 303(i) provides damages for involuntary petitions 
brought in bad faith.  11 U.S.C. §§ 303(i), 523. 
 19. See Jean Braucher, Getting Realistic:  In Defense of Formulaic Means Testing,  
83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 395, 397 (2009) (noting that Congress attempted to reduce 
discretion by adding a formulaic means test); see also infra Part III.A (arguing that 
courts erroneously uphold cases granting bad faith dismissals because Congress 
intentionally omitted bad faith as cause for dismissal and preserved the objective 
nature of § 707(a)). 
 20. E.g., In re O’Brien, 328 B.R. at 674 (dismissing the case under § 707(a) for bad 
faith after considering the totality of the circumstances of the debtor’s financial 
situation); U.S. Trustee v. Lacrosse (In re Lacrosse), 244 B.R. 583, 588–89 (Bankr. 
M.D. Pa. 1999) (dismissing the debtor’s petition under § 707(a) due to his 
fraudulent conduct, which indicated that he lacked good faith); In re Griffieth,  
209 B.R. at 827 (dismissing the debtors’ Chapter 7 petition because the debtors were 
unwilling to alter their comfortable lifestyle to be able to afford to repay their 
creditors). 
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holding, these courts have misread the Code and have inserted a 
factual and subjective inquiry into a subsection that is intended to 
ensure compliance with the technical and procedural requirements 
of filing for bankruptcy.21  The relevant inquiry concerns only 
whether the debtor has met these procedural requirements and has 
passed the means test, an objective inquiry that looks to see whether 
his income exceeds the median income of his state of residence 
(“state median income”).22  The analysis therefore turns not on the 
financial situation of the debtor, but on whether his case is 
procedurally sound. 
This Comment argues that under § 707(a), bad faith should not 
constitute cause for dismissal.  Part I provides an overview of the 
overarching purpose of the bankruptcy system and of § 707.  It then 
summarizes the existing circuit split over whether § 707(a) permits 
courts to grant bad faith dismissals and concludes by discussing the 
congressional intent behind the BAPCPA.  Next, Part II provides a 
comprehensive statutory construction analysis of § 707(a) that 
addresses the continued preservation of the distinct analyses under 
the two subsections, the alternative remedies that are provided in 
other sections of the Code, and the distinguishing factors between 
Chapter 7 cases and cases filed under Chapter 11 and 13. 
Part III explains why the judicial discretion exercised by courts in 
broadly interpreting § 707(a) to grant bad faith dismissals is both 
problematic and excessive, especially in light of the BAPCPA.  After 
analyzing the positive movement towards a less subjective inquiry and 
towards adopting the Ninth Circuit’s general rejection of bad faith 
dismissals, Part III closes by using an exemplar case to demonstrate 
the practical consequences of the continued misinterpretation.  Part 
IV concludes with the recommendation that courts should no longer 
grant bad faith dismissals under § 707(a) and urges Congress to enact 
more objective standards and clearly articulate its intentions through 
amendments or additions to the Code in order to increase 
consistency among decisions in the lower courts. 
                                                 
 21. See In re Griffieth, 209 B.R. at 827 (enumerating six common factors that 
courts have considered in determining whether the petition was filed in bad faith); 
Kennedy, supra note 15, at 395–99 (listing factors that courts commonly considered 
when determining whether the debtor filed in bad faith as well as decisions in which 
the courts have applied the “judge-made rule that bad faith constitutes cause for 
dismissal under section 707(a) allowing the courts to ‘weed out’ undeserving chapter 
7 debtors”). 
 22. See infra notes 49–51 and accompanying text (discussing the debtor’s 
eligibility for Chapter 7 bankruptcy based on whether his income exceeds or falls 
below the state median income). 
  
2010] THE CASE AGAINST “BAD FAITH” DISMISSALS 691 
I. BACKGROUND 
The bankruptcy system serves to provide a “fresh start,” but not a 
head start,23 for the “honest but unfortunate debtor.”24  Bankruptcy is 
not a right, but a privilege that furnishes remedies to both creditors 
and debtors25 and should not be used to eliminate the obligations of 
debtors who are capable of paying all or a portion of their debts.26  
Debtors, however, may attempt to file for bankruptcy in hopes of 
cheating their creditors from partial or even full repayment and may 
incur debt with the intention of purposefully discharging it by filing 
for bankruptcy.27  The bankruptcy system seeks to eliminate such 
opportunistic filings because they are an abuse of the system.28 
                                                 
 23. See In re Krohn, 886 F.2d 123, 127–28 (6th Cir. 1989), aff’g In re Krohn,  
79 B.R. 829 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987) (affirming the bankruptcy court’s dismissal on 
the grounds that granting relief would constitute substantial abuse and that the 
debtor “appear[ed] to be seeking a ‘head start’ with no attempt to deal with creditors 
on an equitable basis” (quoting In re Krohn, 79 B.R. at 833)); McLaughlin v. Jones 
(In re Jones), 114 B.R. 917, 925 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990) (“The Bankruptcy Code is 
intended to serve those persons who, despite their best efforts, find themselves 
hopelessly adrift in a sea of debt.  Bankruptcy protection was not intended to assist 
those who, despite their own misconduct, are attempting to preserve a comfortable 
standard of living at the expense of their creditors.”); In re Brown, 88 B.R. 280, 285 
(Bankr. D. Haw. 1988) (emphasizing that, granting a debtor who seeks to discharge 
his debts while shielding his wealth defeats the purpose of bankruptcy of providing a 
“fresh start” and instead permits the debtor to “live like a king”). 
 24. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (stating that the 
purpose of bankruptcy is to give “the honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders 
for distribution the property which he owns at the time of bankruptcy[] a new 
opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure 
and discouragement of pre-existing debt”). 
 25. See In re Khan, 172 B.R. 613, 625 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1994) (noting that many 
sections of the Code, including §§ 522, 523, and 727 provide creditors with 
alternative remedies that minimizes the risk of the total loss of assets and dismissal of 
the petition); Tribble, supra note 3, at 789 (relaying that through bankruptcy, 
creditors are repaid at least a portion of the outstanding debt and debtors can obtain 
a fresh start to help them get back on their feet). 
 26. See National Bankruptcy Review Commission Report:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 3 
(Nov. 13, 1997) (testimony of Rep. George Gekas, Chairman, Subcomm. on 
Commercial and Admin. Law) (“Historically, bankruptcy was intended as a last 
resort, pursued only under the most dire of situations; for instance, the loss of a job, 
an illness in the family, death of a spouse.  Unfortunately, bankruptcy has become a 
way for reckless spenders to escape their debts.”). 
 27. See In re Brown, 88 B.R. 280, 284 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1988) (asserting that 
Congress never intended for bankruptcy to serve as “a refuge for the unscrupulous 
and cunning individual”); 151 CONG. REC. E737 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2005) (statement 
of Rep. Tiahrt) (emphasizing debtor’s abuse of bankruptcy by using it “as a tool for 
fraud to cheat their way out of debt”). 
 28. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 2 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 
89 (“The purpose of the [BAPCPA] is to improve bankruptcy law and practice by 
restoring personal responsibility and integrity in the bankruptcy system and ensure 
that the system is fair for both debtors and creditors.”). 
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A. An Overview of Bankruptcy Cases Under Chapters 7, 11, and 13 and a 
Debtor’s Eligibility for Each Chapter 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy, otherwise known as liquidation, requires the 
debtor to relinquish all assets in which he has a legal or equitable 
interest, except for assets that may be claimed as exempt, in return 
for a complete discharge of all of his debts.29  In this orderly, court-
supervised procedure, the trustee liquidates the debtor’s non-exempt 
assets, or in other words, reduces them to cash, and distributes the 
proceeds to the creditors.30  Congress designed this type of 
bankruptcy to be available only to the “honest but unfortunate 
debtor,” one who is truly unable to repay his debts now or in the 
future.31 
Unlike liquidation, a Chapter 11 or 13 reorganization case allows 
the debtor to restructure his financial situation and keep his assets 
while repaying his creditors under a payment plan approved by the 
court.32  A debtor who wishes to avoid liquidation and continue 
engaging in business typically files under Chapter 11 bankruptcy.33  
On the other hand, a case under Chapter 13 is usually filed by a 
debtor who has regular income but seeks a payment plan to “catch 
up” on overdue payments.34 
In reorganization, the debtor must propose a repayment plan 
typically lasting three to five years under which he will repay his 
creditors by making regular predetermined payments to the trustee.35  
                                                 
 29. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 109, 726 (2006) (delineating the eligibility and property 
distribution requirements of Chapter 7 bankruptcy). 
 30. JAMES C. DUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 
BANKRUPTCY BASICS 6 (3d ed. 2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
bankruptcycourts/bankbasics.pdf.  The proceeds are distributed by priority and 
secured creditors have priority over unsecured creditors.  Id. at 17–18. 
 31. See H.R. REP. NO. 55–65, at 32 (1897) (“[W]hen an honest man is hopelessly 
down financially, nothing is gained for the public by keeping him down, but, on the 
contrary, the public good will be promoted by having his assets distributed ratably as 
far as they will go among his creditors and letting him start anew.”). 
 32. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 10–11 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 
97; see DUFF, supra note 30, at 25–26 (detailing the factors considered in preparing a 
repayment plan and a timeline of events leading up to the confirmation hearing).  
The payment amounts are calculated based on the debtor’s anticipated income over 
the life of the plan.  Id. at 26. 
 33. See DUFF, supra note 30, at 31 (detailing whether personal and/or business 
assets are placed at risk when different types of businesses, which include 
corporations, sole proprietorships, and partnerships, file for bankruptcy). 
 34. See id. at 7 (noting also that Chapter 13 bankruptcy is utilized by debtors 
ineligible for Chapter 7 bankruptcy).  Chapter 13 bankruptcy, however, is limited to 
debtors whose unsecured debts do not exceed $336,900 and whose secured debts do 
not exceed $1,010,650; these limits are adjusted periodically to match the changes in 
the consumer price index.  Id. at 22. 
 35. See id. at 22, 30 (explaining that, for cases involving individuals, the payment 
plan will typically last three years if the debtor’s income is less than the median 
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Unlike liquidation, where the debtor is required to relinquish all 
claims to non-exempt assets, under reorganization, the debtor must 
turn over all of his projected disposable income.36  In return, while 
the plan is in effect and while the debtor continues to make timely 
payments, he is protected from all lawsuits, garnishments, and actions 
by creditors seeking recovery of the outstanding debt.37  The debts 
covered by the plan are discharged once the payment plan is satisfied 
and paid in full.38 
B. Dismissal of Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Cases Under 11 U.S.C. § 707 
Under § 707 of the Code, a creditor or trustee can move to dismiss 
or convert a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case to a case under Chapter 11 or 
Chapter 13.39  Section 707(a) allows a court to dismiss or convert a 
case “for cause” and enumerates three examples of “cause”: 
(1) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to 
creditors; (2) nonpayment of any fees or charges required under 
chapter 123 of title 28; and (3) failure of the debtor in a voluntary 
case to file . . . the information required by paragraph (1) of 
section 521, but only on a motion by the United States trustee.40 
These enumerated causes are technical and procedural in nature 
and are not exhaustive.41 
Congress amended the Code in 1984 and added § 707(b) to apply 
specifically to cases filed by debtors with “primarily consumer debts.”42  
                                                 
income of his state of residence, while if the debtor’s income exceeds his state’s 
median income, the payment plan will generally be for five years). 
 36. See id. at 25 (noting that in return for relinquishing all projected disposable 
income, the debtor may not be required to pay off all of his unsecured debt).  
Disposable income is the debtor’s income “less amounts reasonably necessary for the 
maintenance or support of the debtor or dependents and less charitable 
contributions up to 15% of the debtor’s gross income.”  Id. at 26. 
 37. See id. at 24 (discussing the automatic stay provided under § 362). 
 38. Id. at 27.  Discharge applies to some, but not all of the debtor’s debts.  Id.  
For example, § 523 of the Code provides nineteen categories of debt that are 
excepted from discharge under Chapter 7 bankruptcy and additional debts are 
excepted from discharge under Chapter 13 bankruptcy.  See infra Part II.B 
(discussing the other sections of the Code that prevent total discharge of a debtor’s 
debt). 
 39. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) (2006). 
 40. Id. § 707(a). 
 41. See S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 94 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5880 
(“These causes are not exhaustive, but merely illustrative.” (emphasis added)). 
 42. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 11–13 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 
98.  Under § 101(8), consumer debt is defined as debt “incurred by an individual 
primarily for a personal, family, or household purpose.”  11 U.S.C. § 101(8).  To 
meet the threshold of “primarily consumer debts,” the debts “must exceed more 
than half the total debt for dismissal under § 707(b).”  Id.; see also Stewart v. U.S. 
Trustee (In re Stewart), 175 F.3d 796, 808 (10th Cir. 1999) (drawing the definition of 
“primarily” from a non-bankruptcy context to mean “more than fifty percent”). 
  
694 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:685 
If the court finds that granting relief under Chapter 7 would 
constitute “substantial abuse” of the bankruptcy system or that the 
debtor can, without undue hardship, repay a significant portion of 
his debt under a reorganization payment plan, the court may order 
the case to be dismissed or converted to a Chapter 11 or 13 case.43  
Section 707(b) was added in response to concerns that debtors would 
turn to bankruptcy relief to avoid satisfying their obligations despite 
being able to pay.44 
The BAPCPA left § 707(a) completely unchanged but significantly 
amended § 707(b).45  First, for a court to consider a motion to dismiss 
under § 707(b), creditors and trustees now only bear the burden of 
establishing that granting the debtor bankruptcy relief would be an 
“abuse” and not a “substantial abuse” of the bankruptcy system.46  
This makes it easier for creditors and trustees to move to dismiss a 
case and eliminates some of the leeway a debtor previously enjoyed in 
filing for bankruptcy.47  Second, if a presumption of abuse does not 
arise or is rebutted, courts may grant dismissal or conversion if the 
creditors or trustees can establish that the debtor filed the petition in 
bad faith or that the totality of the circumstances of the debtor’s 
financial situation demonstrates abuse.48 
Additionally, Congress increased the impartiality of § 707(b) by 
adding the means test, a two-step objective test that determines the 
debtor’s eligibility to file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.49  First, if the 
                                                 
 43. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b); Fonder v. United States, 974 F.2d 996, 999 (8th Cir. 1992) 
(holding that the essential inquiry is whether the debtor’s ability to repay his 
creditors with future income constitutes abuse). 
 44. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 12 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 98. 
 45. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. 
No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of  
11 U.S.C.).  See generally Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Catching Can-Pay 
Debtors:  Is the Means Test the Only Way?, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 665 (2005) 
(detailing the new provisions contained in the amended § 707(b) and the factors 
considered in the new analysis). 
 46. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1). 
 47. The “substantial abuse” standard was implemented by the Bankruptcy 
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 but was never defined.  See H.R. REP. 
NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 12 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 98 (“The standard 
for dismissal—substantial abuse—is inherently vague, which has lead [sic] to its 
disparate interpretation and application by the bankruptcy bench.  Some courts, for 
example, hold that a debtor’s ability to repay a significant portion of his or her debts 
out of future income constitutes substantial abuse and therefore is cause for 
dismissal; others do not.” (citations omitted)). 
 48. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3). 
 49. See Eugene R. Wedoff, Means Testing in the New § 707(b), 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
231, 232–34, 237 (2005) (providing a comprehensive discussion of the means test 
and the new provisions contained in § 707(b)).  Section 707(b)(2)(A)(i) provides, in 
relevant part: 
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debtor’s current monthly income is less than the median income of 
the state in which he resides, he is eligible for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.50  
In cases where the debtor’s income exceeds the state median income, 
the second prong of the means test applies, and the debtor may file 
for bankruptcy if his disposable income does not exceed $166.67 per 
month.51  If the debtor fails both prongs, a presumption of abuse 
arises, and the debtor is ineligible for bankruptcy relief unless he 
rebuts the presumption.52 
To rebut the presumption of abuse, the debtor may make a 
showing of special circumstances that justifies any additional 
expenses or adjustments to his income.53  Congress, however, 
imposed limitations on the amount allowed of these additional 
expenses and income adjustment.54  If the presumption is successfully 
                                                 
[T]he court shall presume abuse exists if the debtor’s current monthly 
income reduced by the amounts determined under clauses (ii), (iii), and 
(iv), and multiplied by 60 is not less than the lesser of—(I) 25 percent of the 
debtor’s nonpriority unsecured claims in the case, or $6,000, whichever is 
greater; or (II) $10,000. 
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i). 
 50. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A); see Charles J. Tabb & Jillian K. McClelland, Living 
with the Means Test, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 463, 469–70 (2007) (detailing the calculations 
involved to determine a debtor’s current monthly income and its comparison with 
the state median income for a family of the same size). 
 51. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A) (providing a formula to determine when a 
debtor can properly file for bankruptcy, whereby if a debtor’s current monthly 
income exceeds $166.67, his income would exceed the $10,000 limit when multiplied 
by sixty, leading the court to presume abuse); Tabb & McClelland, supra note 50, at 
470–71 (explaining the six-step computation contained in Form B22A filed by 
debtors that is used to determine whether a presumption of abuse arises); Wedoff, 
supra note 49, at 238–39 (explaining the applicable median income utilized to 
determine whether a creditor has standing to bring a motion to dismiss under 
§ 707(b) and providing an overview of the means test).  The debtor’s disposable 
income is his current monthly income less his necessary expenses, average monthly 
payments of secured debts, and expenses for payment of all priority claims.   
Id. at 240.  The debtor’s monthly expenses is not the debtor’s actual monthly 
expenses, but is limited to reasonable and necessary expenses, which include food, 
housekeeping supplies, apparel and services, personal care products and services, 
and miscellaneous expenses.  Id. at 252–54.  Other expenses that may be included in 
the debtor’s monthly expenses are delineated in § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii).  Id. at 264–71.  
Sections 707(b)(A)(2)(iii) and 707(b)(2)(A)(iv) detail the calculations performed to 
determine the deductions for secured and priority claims, respectively.  Id. at 273–75. 
 52. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)–(3). 
 53. Id. § 707(b)(2)(B); e.g., In re Johns, 342 B.R. 626, 629 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 
2006) (delineating two examples of special circumstances listed in § 707(b)(2)(B) 
that may rebut a presumption of abuse:  (1) serious medical condition and (2) a call 
to active duty in the Armed Forces). 
 54. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(iv); see Tabb & McClelland, supra note 50, at  
498–500 (providing examples of special circumstances that could rebut the 
presumption of abuse but emphasizing the need to establish the circumstances that 
fall into this category because bankruptcy judges have been overly generous in 
allowing “almost anything [to] qualify, as long as the debtor can show necessity, 
reasonableness, and lack of a reasonable alternative” (internal footnote omitted) 
(citing 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i))). 
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rebutted or does not arise, the court will consider whether granting 
relief would constitute an abuse of the system by examining whether 
the debtor filed in bad faith or whether the totality of the 
circumstances of the debtor’s financial situation demonstrates 
abuse.55 
C. Circuit Courts of Appeals Were Split Over Whether Bad Faith Dismissals 
Should Be Granted Under § 707(a) 
While the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
generally has not required that the debtor file for bankruptcy in good 
faith, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Third, Sixth, and 
Eighth Circuits have imposed this good faith filing requirement.   
The Sixth Circuit established the implicit good faith filing 
requirement by broadly interpreting the language of § 707(a) and by 
focusing heavily on the word “including,” which it believed 
demonstrated Congress’ intent that the enumerated causes be  
non-exhaustive.56  The Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have made 
factual inquiries as to the existence of good faith at the time the 
debtor filed for bankruptcy and have considered a variety of factors 
in these inquiries, resulting in bad faith dismissals under § 707(a).57 
The Third and Sixth Circuits have applied the broadest 
interpretation of § 707(a) and held that a debtor’s lack of good faith 
alone is a sufficient justification to dismiss “egregious cases” under 
Chapter 7.58  “Egregious cases” involve concealment or 
misrepresentation of assets and income, a lavish lifestyle, or an intent 
to avoid considerable debt through fraud, misconduct, or gross 
negligence by the debtor.59 
In In re Zick,60 the Sixth Circuit dismissed a Chapter 7 petition 
because the debtor, who incurred a court-induced mediation award 
                                                 
 55. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3); see Tabb & McClelland, supra note 50, at 500–01 
(discussing the court’s analysis under § 707(b)(3) and listing factors courts have 
considered in the past in their analyses of the “totality of the circumstances” of a 
case). 
 56. See Indus. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Zick (In re Zick), 931 F.2d 1124, 1126–27  
(6th Cir. 1991) (placing heavy emphasis on the word “including” and stating that it 
was “not meant to be a limiting word”). 
 57. See infra notes 58–80 and accompanying text (discussing the circuit split over 
whether § 707(a) permits courts to grant bad faith dismissals). 
 58. E.g., In re Zick, 931 F.2d at 1129; Tamecki v. Frank (In re Tamecki), 229 F.3d 
205, 207 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting In re Zick, 931 F.2d at 1129). 
 59. In re Zick, 931 F.2d at 1129; see also In re Sudderth, No. 06-10660, 2007 WL 
119141, at *2 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Jan. 9, 2007) (expanding the definition of “egregious 
cases” to include any abuse of the provisions, purpose, or spirit of the bankruptcy 
system). 
 60. 931 F.2d 1124 (6th Cir. 1991). 
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of $600,000 a few days before filing the petition, failed to make a 
showing that he filed for bankruptcy in good faith.61  In addition to 
finding that the petition was filed in response to the mediation 
award, the court found that the debtor’s manipulations reduced the 
number of creditors to one, the debtor failed to change his lifestyle 
or make any effort to repay his debt, and the debtor’s use of Chapter 
7 bankruptcy was unfair.62  The Sixth Circuit held that, as a matter of 
“smell,”63 the debtor’s failure to present evidence as to why his 
petition should not have been dismissed and why he made no effort 
to repay his debt eliminated the need for an evidentiary hearing and 
warranted dismissal of the case.64 
The Third Circuit has similarly granted motions to dismiss under 
§ 707(a) upon finding that the debtor failed to meet his burden of 
proving that he filed the petition in good faith after the creditor 
alleged that he filed in bad faith.65  In In re Tamecki,66 the court held 
that the debtor’s assertion that he incurred the debt for subsistence 
purposes but intended to repay the debt was insufficient to establish 
that he filed in good faith.67  The debtor acquired a “comparatively 
large consumer debt” right before filing for bankruptcy and 
continued to use his exempted property.68  The court held that these 
factors sufficiently questioned the existence of good faith to justify 
dismissal of the case.69 
The Third and Sixth Circuits have placed heavy emphasis on the 
role of bankruptcy courts as courts of equity that focus on what is fair 
                                                 
 61. Id. at 1125, 1129. 
 62. Id. at 1128.  The court also emphasized that the debtor’s financial statements 
indicated that he continued to receive $7,000 a month from his pension plan 
benefits, that his non-debtor spouse had additional income, and that he possessed 
other property worth $90,000.  Id. 
 63. See id. at 1127–28 (applying the “smell test” established in Morgan Fiduciary, 
Ltd. v. Citizens & S. Int’l Bank, 95 B.R. 232, 234 (S.D. Fla. 1988), which is “far from 
being merely a subjective olfactory whim; it is based on numerous objective factors”).  
In Morgan Fiduciary, the bankruptcy court stated that in some situations, judges will 
find that “a certain case or claim or defense has a bad odor.  Simply put, a matter 
smells.  Some smell so bad they stink.”  Morgan Fiduciary, 95 B.R. at 234. 
 64. In re Zick, 931 F.3d at 1129. 
 65. E.g., Tamecki v. Frank (In re Tamecki), 229 F.3d 205, 207 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(citing positively to the Sixth Circuit’s decision in In re Zick).  Courts in the Second 
Circuit have also followed In re Zick by dismissing cases that lack a showing of good 
faith, but the Second Circuit has yet to rule on whether bad faith constitutes cause 
for dismissal under § 707(a).  E.g., In re O’Brien, 328 B.R. 669, 674 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 
2005); Blumenberg v. Yihye (In re Blumenberg), 263 B.R. 704, 712 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 
2001). 
 66. 229 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 67. Id. at 208. 
 68. Id. at 207–08. 
 69. Id. 
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and just,70 and many other courts have applied similar reasoning to 
justify granting dismissal upon a finding of bad faith.71  They have not 
only focused on preserving the integrity of the bankruptcy system but 
have also highlighted the importance of providing a fresh start only 
to the “honest but unfortunate debtor” who has “clean hands and an 
honorable purpose.”72  Further, they have also reasoned that it was 
not an abuse of discretion to conclude that the debtor lacked good 
faith because these inquiries were carefully confined to “egregious 
cases.”73 
On the other hand, the Eighth Circuit has upheld a narrower 
reading of § 707(a) and has limited bad faith dismissals to cases 
involving “extreme misconduct falling outside the purview of more 
specific Code provisions.”74  In doing so, it has maintained a stronger 
focus on the text of the standard of dismissal under § 707(a) than the 
Third and Sixth Circuits. 
For example, in In re Huckfeldt,75 the Eighth Circuit found that the 
debtor filed the petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy to frustrate the 
divorce court decree and force his ex-wife into bankruptcy.76   
                                                 
 70. E.g., Indus. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Zick (In re Zick), 931 F.2d 1124, 1126 (6th Cir. 
1991) (noting that bankruptcy judges have discretion to dismiss a petition because 
equitable principles may be considered when interpreting and applying the Code 
(citing Peterson v. Atlas Supply Corp. (In re Atlas Supply Corp.), 857 F.2d 1061, 1063 
(5th Cir. 1988))); In re Madeline Marie Nursing Homes, 694 F.2d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 
1982) (“As courts of equity, bankruptcy courts ‘will look through the form to the 
substance of any particular transaction and may contrive new remedies where those 
in law are inadequate.  Where the Bankruptcy Act is silent, equitable principles will 
govern.’” (quoting 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 2.09, at 173–75 (14th ed. 1974))); In 
re Jabarin, 395 B.R. 330, 339–40 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2008) (applying a balancing test 
involving a factually intensive assessment that considers the debtor’s situation as well 
as the effects of dismissal on the creditors and that provides courts with the flexibility 
to make an “equitable determination” as to whether dismissal is proper). 
 71. See, e.g., Bilzerian v. SEC (In re Bilzerian), 276 B.R. 285, 293–95 (M.D. Fla. 
2002) (adopting the holding in In re Zick and finding that the debtor’s motives and 
inability to discharge any debt constituted sufficient grounds for dismissal under 
§ 707(a)).  But see In re Linehan, 326 B.R. 474, 477–78 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005) 
(adopting the narrower reading of § 707(a) of the Eighth Circuit to hold that bad 
faith dismissals should only be implemented in egregious cases because of the lack of 
statutory authority). 
 72. McLaughlin v. Jones (In re Jones), 114 B.R. 917, 926 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990) 
(citing In re Brown, 88 B.R. 280, 284 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1988)); see also In re 
Motaharnia, 215 B.R. 63, 68 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that bad faith may 
constitute cause only in egregious situations where the debtor’s motives are 
inconsistent with the purpose of the Code). 
 73. In re Zick, 931 F.2d at 1128–29.  Some bankruptcy courts have even justified 
dismissals for lack of good faith by stating that they have an inherent authority to 
control their own docket.  In re Jones, 114 B.R. at 926 (quoting Landis v. North 
American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)). 
 74. Huckfeldt v. Huckfeldt (In re Huckfeldt), 39 F.3d 829, 832 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(citing In re Khan, 172 B.R. 613, 624–26 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1994)). 
 75. 39 F.3d 829 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 76. Id. at 832. 
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The court held that such extreme conduct made the debtor 
“anything but an ‘honest but unfortunate debtor,’” justifying 
dismissal for bad faith.77  Other examples of “extreme misconduct” 
included using bankruptcy as a “scorched earth” tactic against a 
diligent creditor or as protection against litigation when the debtor 
was not in a state of financial distress.78 
In narrowing the permissible scope of bad faith dismissals, the 
Eighth Circuit expressed concern that courts following the Sixth 
Circuit’s approach could use the good faith inquiry as a “loose 
cannon” to justify bad faith dismissals of debtors “whose values do not 
coincide precisely with those of the court.”79  It argued that the 
“broadly-framed maxims” applied by the Third and Sixth Circuits can 
lead only to one possible outcome:  ejection of a debtor from the 
protection of the bankruptcy system because he was not as 
“deserving” as other petitioners.80  The Eighth Circuit also rejected 
the implicit good faith filing requirement as it was drawn from too 
broad of a reading of § 707(a) and remains unsupported by any 
provision pertaining to Chapter 7.81 
Lastly, in In re Padilla,82 the Ninth Circuit held that bad faith 
generally does not constitute cause for dismissal under § 707(a).83   
In this case, the debtor accrued almost $100,000 of credit card debt 
that was related to gambling, giving rise to the trustee’s allegation 
that the debtor performed a “credit card bust-out” during the ten 
months before he filed his petition for bankruptcy.84  The trustee also 
argued that based on his assets and financial situation, the debtor did 
not have the ability to repay his debt.85 
                                                 
 77. Id. 
 78. See In re Khan, 172 B.R. at 624–26 (noting that a bad faith filing exists if the 
debtor files for bankruptcy to hide from adjudication in another court). 
 79. In re Huckfeldt, 39 F.3d at 832 (quoting Sinkow v. Latimer (In re Latimer),  
82 B.R. 354, 364 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988)). 
 80. In re Khan, 172 B.R. at 620 (characterizing the debtor as a “rapacious and 
unworthy person who has attempted to subvert statutory remedies meant only for 
more ‘deserving’ and more impecunious petitioners”). 
 81. See id. at 621 (asserting that the implicit good faith filing requirement serves 
to better a layperson’s perception, and not a professional’s understanding, of the 
judicial process). 
 82. Neary v. Padilla (In re Padilla), 222 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 83. Id. at 1192–93. 
 84. See id. at 1187–88 (stating that a “credit card bust-out” occurs when a debtor 
accumulates “consumer debt in anticipation of filing for bankruptcy”); Culhane & 
White, supra note 45, at 698–99 (discussing that credit card “bust-outs” are commonly 
targeted misconduct under § 707(b)(3) but should properly be denied discharge 
under § 523 because § 707 defeats the protections afforded to debtors). 
 85. In re Padilla, 222 F.3d at 1187–88.  Specifically, the trustee noted that the 
debtor’s take-home pay of $1950 barely covered his monthly expenses of $1830 and 
that his “assets consisted of his house and personal property.”  Id. at 1187.   
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In denying the trustee’s motion to dismiss, the court focused on 
two primary considerations.  First, the court looked to the canons of 
statutory construction, which require that the more specific 
provisions take precedence over general provisions, regardless of the 
order of enactment.86  Since a bad faith inquiry is provided under 
§ 707(b), framing a § 707(a) analysis around bad faith misdirects the 
court from the actual focus of the inquiry:  whether the debtor 
violated any of the technical and procedural requirements that 
constitute cause for dismissal.87 
Second, the court distinguished cases under Chapters 11 and 13 
from Chapter 7 cases and found that bad faith can per se constitute 
cause for dismissal of a Chapter 11 or 13 case,88 but may not justify 
dismissal of a Chapter 7 case under § 707(a).89  The court also noted 
that the debtor’s debts were solely consumer debts, indicating that 
the case could have properly been brought under § 707(b), which 
addresses misconduct including credit card bust-outs.90  The debtor 
did not falsify information or delay the administration of the 
proceedings and met all of the technical and procedural 
requirements to file for bankruptcy under Chapter 7.91  As a result, 
                                                 
The debtor’s house had a fair market value of $115,000 but was mortgaged for 
$145,000, and the debtor claimed an exemption for most of his personal property, 
which was valued at $11,745.  Id. at 1187–88. 
 86. Id. at 1192 (citing In re Khan, 172 B.R. at 624).  The court noted four 
available protections in the Code that allow creditors and trustees to object to debt 
discharge, including §§ 523, 727, 707(a), and 707(b).  Id. at 1191–92. 
 87. In re Padilla, 222 F.3d at 1192 (citing Huckfeldt v. Huckfeldt (In re 
Huckfeldt), 39 F.3d 829, 832 (8th Cir. 1994)).  But see In re Brown, 88 B.R. 280, 283–
85 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1988) (holding that “[g]ood faith is an implicit jurisdictional 
requirement” that calls for an inquiry into any abuse of the purpose or provisions of 
the bankruptcy system and whether the debtor is an “honest but unfortunate debtor” 
who deserves a “fresh start” and justifying the bad faith dismissal under § 707(a) by 
noting that the debtor must be willing to use all resources to try to pay his creditors 
because the bankruptcy court “is a [c]ourt of equity and a person seeking relief 
under the Code must come in with clean hands, with an honorable purpose”). 
 88. Id. at 1193; see 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129, 1325 (2006) (providing that a court may 
confirm a reorganization repayment plan only if it is proposed in good faith).   
The court emphasized that unlike liquidation, the debtor-creditor relationship is 
maintained after the debtor files for Chapter 11 or 13 reorganization in support of 
allowing bad faith to be a per se cause for dismissal in reorganization but not in 
liquidation.  In re Padilla, 222 F.3d at 1193. 
 89. In re Padilla, 222 F.3d at 1192–93. 
 90. Id. at 1193.  The court discussed the purpose of § 707(b), which Congress 
enacted specifically as a remedy for abusive filings that allows courts “to prevent the 
discharge of debt owed by non-needy consumer debtors and to deal equitably when 
an unscrupulous consumer attempts to use the bankruptcy court as part of a scheme 
to take unfair advantage of his creditors.”  Id. at 1194 (quoting In re Motaharnia,  
215 B.R. 63, 67 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1997)). 
 91. Id. at 1193.  
  
2010] THE CASE AGAINST “BAD FAITH” DISMISSALS 701 
the court voided the bankruptcy court’s discharge of the debtor’s 
debt and held that cause did not exist to justify dismissal.92 
D. Bankruptcy Reform Through the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 
In an attempt to control the rise of bankruptcy filings and 
eliminate opportunistic and abusive filings,93 the National Bankruptcy 
Review Committee held numerous hearings to entertain continued 
discussion over the proposed means test and other suggested 
amendments.94  Proponents highlighted four main factors to 
emphasize the need for bankruptcy reform.95  First, the alarming 
increase of consumer bankruptcy filings did not appear to be a 
temporary event, but instead a trend that would continue if Congress 
failed to take action.96  Second, significant losses from the discharge 
of debt borne by creditors were also borne by the whole economy 
because the creditors’ losses translated into a “tax” on every 
household in the nation.97  Additionally, the loopholes in the Code 
provided numerous opportunities for abusive filings.98  Lastly, a 
                                                 
 92. Id. at 1194. 
 93. Opportunistic filings are those in which the consumers file for Chapter 7 
bankruptcy as an easy way out or for those who incur debt with the intention of 
discharging it in bankruptcy.  See generally Elijah M. Alper, Note, Opportunistic Informal 
Bankruptcy:  How BAPCPA May Fail to Make Wealthy Debtors Pay Up, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 
1908 (2007) (arguing that although the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 eliminated loopholes previously exploited by 
“opportunistic debtors,” the law will ultimately encourage these debtors to adopt 
“informal bankruptcy” tactics to evade the spirit of the law). 
 94. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 6–14 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
88, 92–101 (detailing Congress’ attempt at passing bankruptcy reform legislation, 
which had been ongoing for eight years); see also Robert J. Landry, III, The Means 
Test:  Finding a Safe Harbor, Passing the Means Test, or Rebutting the Presumption of Abuse 
May Not Be Enough, 29 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 245, 246 (2009) (emphasizing that the 
bankruptcy reform debates have been ongoing for five different sessions of 
Congress).  See generally Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485 (2005) 
(discussing the debates and amendments, proposed and rejected, leading up to the 
enactment of the BAPCPA and the means test). 
 95. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 3–5 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 
90–92. 
 96. See id. at 3–4, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 90–91 (highlighting the 
increase in bankruptcy filings from one million in 1998 to 1.6 million in 2004 to 
counter the opponents’ contentions that abusive filings were not widespread and 
that “most bankruptcy filings result from causes beyond debtors’ control, such as 
family illness, job loss or disruption, or divorce”). 
 97. See id. at 4–5, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 91 (examining the $18.9 
billion in losses incurred by credit card companies due to consumer bankruptcy 
filings in 2002 and approximately $900 million Congress anticipates credit unions 
will lose from consumer bankruptcy filings in 2004). 
 98. See id. at 5, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 92 (stating that although 
trustees bring actions against abusive filings, the trustees have found that these filings 
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debtor who was able to repay a significant portion of his debt may 
have successfully obtained debt discharge through bankruptcy.99 
As a result, the BAPCPA was enacted to provide reform measures 
that served “to improve bankruptcy law and practice by restoring 
personal responsibility and integrity in the bankruptcy system and 
ensure that the system is fair for both debtors and creditors.”100  It 
focused on controlling the increase in bankruptcy filings by imposing 
additional requirements on debtors wishing to obtain bankruptcy 
relief and by highlighting problems—such as the lack of personal 
financial accountability and the absence of effective oversight to 
eliminate abusive filings—that needed to be remedied.101  Bad faith, 
however, was never enumerated as a cause for dismissal under  
§ 707(a), and the language and scope of this technical and 
procedural subsection remained entirely unchanged.102  Thus, 
Congress maintained consistency with its previous statement that a 
“debtor’s ability to repay his debts, in whole or in part,” does not 
constitute “adequate cause for dismissal.”103 
Many disapproved of the means test—the heart of the bankruptcy 
reform104—and contended that this screening mechanism eliminated 
too much judicial discretion.105  They argued that determining a 
                                                 
are more widespread than expected); see also infra note 267 (detailing the 
enforcement actions brought by U.S. Trustees). 
 99. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 5 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 92. 
 100. Id. at 2, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 89. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See Kimlinger & Wassweiler, supra note 15, at 64 (“Where Congress intended 
to impose a good faith requirement it specifically did so.”).  The sole instance of an 
explicit good faith filing requirement in the entire legislative history of the Code was 
Section 74 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1933, which required judges to make a finding 
that the petition was filed in good faith for the case to move forward.  Id.  This 
provision was repealed in the Bankruptcy Act of 1938.  Id.  Despite the continued 
good faith inquiries by a number of courts, its absence in the Code should indicate 
that Congress intended to exclude grants of bad faith dismissals under § 707(a) and 
to limit it to § 707(b).  See id. at 63–66. 
 103. Perlin v. Hitachi Capital Am. Corp., 497 F.3d 364, 372 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing 
S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 94 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5880; H.R. Rep. 
No. 5963, at 380 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6336); see In re Glunk, 
342 B.R. 717, 735 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006) (“[D]ismissal based on a debtor’s ability to 
pay should be disfavored given the detailed, explicit standards for dismissal that 
Congress has established in § 707(b).”). 
 104. See 151 CONG. REC. S1779 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2005) (remarks of Sen. Specter) 
(“The heart of this [BAPCPA] bill is a means test.  It requires the bankruptcy trustee 
to examine the income and expenses of high income debtors and determine 
whether they have the ability to pay something toward their debts.”). 
 105. See Tribble, supra note 3, at 799–804 (2007) (arguing that in mandating 
judges to use a rigid means test, the BAPCPA wrongfully curtailed judicial 
discretion); see also Sean C. Currie, The Multiple Purposes of Bankruptcy:  Restoring 
Bankruptcy’s Social Insurance Function After BAPCPA, 7 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 241, 
248–52 & 249 n.47 (2009) (detailing the debate leading up to the enactment of the 
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debtor’s eligibility to file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy based merely on a 
mechanized objective formula is overly strict and does not allow 
sufficient consideration of special circumstances.106  In particular, 
they raised the concern that the means test risks barring an “honest 
but unfortunate debtor” from relief107 and that its loopholes may 
allow an undeserving debtor to slip through the cracks and receive 
bankruptcy relief.108  As a result, these opponents of the means test 
highlighted the importance of balancing the interests of the creditors 
and debtors in support of a system in which bankruptcy courts retain 
discretion to perform a factual analysis under § 707(a) and consider 
the specific circumstances of the debtor’s financial situation.109 
II. A STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ANALYSIS INDICATES THAT BAD 
FAITH DISMISSALS SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED UNDER § 707(a) 
Section 707(a) allows the court to dismiss a case after notice and 
hearing and only for cause, including unreasonable delay prejudicial 
to creditors, nonpayment of required fees and charges, and failure of 
the debtor to provide required information, including schedules and 
statements.110  The language of § 707(a) offers no support for a good 
faith filing requirement in Chapter 7 cases.111  Additionally, the 
                                                 
BAPCPA and listing the many concerns of the National Bankruptcy Review 
Commission dissenters). 
 106. See Tribble, supra note 3, at 792 (emphasizing that the means test 
problematically limited a judge’s discretion to adjust the result based on the facts of 
the bankruptcy case). 
 107. See id. at 804–05 (noting that the means test fails to distinguish a “chronic 
overspender [from] a family forced into bankruptcy by a large and unexpected 
expense and the mechanized formula may prevent a needy debtor from obtaining 
bankruptcy relief”). 
 108.  See Jensen, supra note 94, at 511 (noting that critics of the BAPCPA have 
characterized the means test as a “formulaic mechanism . . . [that] will not always 
distinguish accurately those debtors who have the capacity to repay from those that 
do not have that capacity” (citation omitted)); see also Michelle J. White, Abuse or 
Protection?  Economics of Bankruptcy Reform Under BAPCPA, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 275, 275 
(2007) (arguing that the BAPCPA created a ten-fold incentive for debtors to stop 
work six months before filings for bankruptcy in order to manipulate the means test, 
which generally looks at the debtor’s financial situation of the six months prior to 
filing for bankruptcy, and that the increased filing fees have deterred some non-
opportunistic debtors from filing for bankruptcy). 
 109. See 144 CONG. REC. S10787 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1998) (statements of Sen. 
Grassley and Sen. Durbin) (preferring a discretionary approach in the Senate bill 
over the mechanical approach in the House bill). 
 110. 11 U.S.C. § 707(a) (2006). 
 111. See Kimlinger & Wassweiler, supra note 15, at 64 (arguing that through its 
repeated omission in the statutory text that applies to Chapter 7 cases, Congress 
deliberately excluded a good faith filing requirement for Chapter 7 cases); see also 
Thomas F. Waldron, Principled Principles of Statutory Interpretation:  A Judicial Perspective 
After Two Years of BAPCPA, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 195, 228 (2007) (suggesting that courts 
should look first to the plain meaning of the statute, followed by an inquiry into 
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existence of other Code provisions that explicitly provide that bad 
faith constitutes cause for dismissal for cases under other chapters112 
further indicates that Congress did not intend to impose a good faith 
filing requirement on a debtor filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.113  
Courts should confine their analyses to the provisions included and 
omitted in each subsection.114  Allowing the cross-application of Code 
provisions is dangerous and defeats the separation between 
provisions that Congress intended to maintain.115 
A. The Allowance of Bad Faith Dismissals Finds No Support in the Statutory 
Text, Purpose, or Legislative History of § 707(a) 
The legislative history of § 707 indicates that Congress did not 
intend for bad faith to constitute cause for dismissal under 
§ 707(a).116  By adding § 707(b) in 1984, Congress established a 
different set of standards to address conduct that falls outside of the 
scope of § 707(a).117  Then, through the BAPCPA of 2005, Congress 
placed a heavy focus on controlling petitions filed by a debtor with 
“primarily consumer debts” in an attempt to eliminate opportunistic 
                                                 
Congressional purpose and intent, before looking to other canons of statutory 
interpretation). 
 112. Congress imposed a good faith filing requirement for cases filed under 
Chapter 9, and, pursuant to § 921(c), a court may dismiss a petition for Chapter 9 
bankruptcy if the debtor did not file in good faith.  11 U.S.C. § 921(c).  Under 
§§ 1129(a)(3) and 1325(a)(3), a court may deny a debtor’s reorganization payment 
plan upon finding that it was not filed in good faith.  Id. §§ 1129(a)(3), 1325(a)(3). 
 113. See Kimlinger & Wassweiler, supra note 15, at 64 (asserting that had Congress 
intended to impose an implicit overall requirement of good faith, it would not have 
expressly incorporated a good faith filing requirement for some but not other 
chapters of bankruptcy). 
 114. See In re Motaharnia, 215 B.R. 63, 67 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1997) (recognizing 
that the two subsections of § 707 were intended to establish different standards that 
serve different purposes). 
 115. See Huckfeldt v. Huckfeldt (In re Huckfeldt), 39 F.3d 829, 832 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(adopting the narrow reading of bad faith because “framing the issue in terms of bad 
faith may tend to misdirect the inquiry away from the fundamental principles and 
purposes of Chapter 7” and arguing the court should not punish a bad faith litigant 
under § 707(a), but may do so under another section). 
 116. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88; S. REP. 
NO. 95-989, at 94 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787; H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, 
at 380 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963; Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 27 
(2005); Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 355 (1984); Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2606 
(1978).  Additionally, the Code has never required a debtor to prove that the filing 
was done in good faith.  See In re Khan, 172 B.R. 613, 622 & n.17 (Bankr. D. Minn. 
1994) (conceding that Congress has never imposed a requirement for the debtor to 
prove good faith as a prerequisite to filing for bankruptcy, but still allowing the court 
to inquire of the debtor’s motivation to determine whether the case should 
proceed). 
 117. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 355 (1984); see In re Motaharnia, 215 B.R. at 67 
(distinguishing the broad nature of § 707(a) from the narrower purpose of § 707(b) 
of preventing the discharge of the debts of debtors who are not “honest but 
unfortunate”). 
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and abusive filings and added guidelines to the bad faith inquiry 
under § 707(b).118 
On the other hand, Congress left § 707(a) unchanged, despite the 
widespread application of an implicit good faith filing requirement 
and the numerous opportunities to add bad faith as an enumerated 
cause for dismissal.119  Standing alone, this repeated and intentional 
omission indicates that Congress intended to exclude bad faith 
dismissals from being granted under § 707(a).120  The focus that 
Congress placed on amending the subjective inquiry under § 707(b) 
also suggests that its attempt to eliminate abusive and bad faith filings 
was heavily reliant on the factual aspects of the case, and not on the 
debtor’s satisfaction of the technical and procedural requirements.121 
Throughout the ongoing amendments to § 707, Congress has 
maintained distinct purposes for each subsection and clearly 
distinguished the objective inquiry under § 707(a) from the 
subjective analysis under § 707(b).122  Section 707(a) has been 
consistently applied to maintain the integrity of the bankruptcy 
system and to quickly dismiss cases that are not procedurally sound.123  
If the trustee or creditor moves to dismiss the case under § 707(a), 
the court is required to grant dismissal within ten days, absent any 
                                                 
 118. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2006); H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1 (2005), reprinted in 
2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88; see Bradley R. Tamm, Substantial Abuse Dismissal Under 11 
U.S.C.A. § 707(b):  Evolution or Malignancy, 13 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 47, 56 (2004) 
(stating that the amendments were primarily aimed at non-needy debtors who could 
reasonably repay a portion of their debts but still sought Chapter 7 relief). 
 119. See supra note 102 (detailing the legislative history of § 707). 
 120. See Kimlinger & Wassweiler, supra note 15, at 63–64 (reviewing the history of 
the requirements to be eligible to file for bankruptcy and emphasizing the lack of 
textual support to impose a good faith filing requirement for Chapter 7 filings).   
But see Little Creek Dev. Co. v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 779 F.2d 1068, 1071 
(5th Cir. 1986) (“Every bankruptcy statute since 1898 has incorporated literally, or by 
judicial interpretation, a standard of good faith for the commencement, prosecution, 
and confirmation of bankruptcy proceedings.”). 
 121. See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 707.03[2], at 707–20 (Alan N. Resnick & 
Henry J. Sommer eds., 15th ed. rev. 2009) (proffering that by adding the bad faith 
inquiry to § 707(b), lower income debtors are no longer subject to abusive bad faith 
dismissal motions). 
 122. See In re Sekendur, 334 B.R. 609, 620 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2005) (maintaining 
that the technical and procedural requirements delineated in § 707(a) serve to 
preserve the integrity of the bankruptcy system (citing Neary v. Padilla (In re Padilla), 
222 F.3d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir. 2000))); In re Motaharnia, 215 B.R. at 67 
(differentiating the standards for dismissal Congress intended to establish under 
§§ 707(a) and 707(b)). 
 123. For a case to be procedurally sound, the debtor must provide a list of 
creditors, a schedule of all assets and liabilities, a statement of the debtor’s financial 
affairs, an itemized statement of the debtor’s monthly net income, and other 
documents detailing the debtor’s duties.  11 U.S.C. § 521(a); see also David Gray 
Carlson, Means Testing:  The Failed Bankruptcy Revolution of 2005, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. 
L. REV. 223, 232 (2007) (detailing the documents that the debtor is required to 
provide to the trustee when filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy pursuant to § 521). 
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request for additional time by the debtor.124  Congress also focused on 
furthering the best interests of the creditors and trustees while 
promoting full repayment of the debts owed.  Provisions including 
§ 707(a)(1) examine whether the debtor created unreasonable delay 
that is prejudicial to the creditors and permits dismissal on such 
procedural grounds.125  On the other hand, § 707(b) determines 
through a factual analysis whether granting relief to the debtor would 
constitute abuse and serves to prevent an undeserving debtor from 
using the bankruptcy system to take unfair advantage of his 
creditors.126 
Section 707(a), however, does not imply that courts are limited to 
the three enumerated causes in § 707(a) because Congress explicitly 
stated that they are not exhaustive.127  Nevertheless, courts’ discretion 
in applying § 707(a) extends only to dismissal for causes that fall 
within its technical and procedural scope,128 and courts have granted 
dismissals only in a limited number of cases for causes beyond those 
enumerated.129  Bad faith remains outside of the purview of § 707(a) 
and therefore should not constitute cause for dismissal.130 
In addition to the apparent differences in text, purpose, and scope, 
the difference in specificity between the two subsections calls for two 
                                                 
 124. See infra notes 205–206 (noting that motions to dismiss are addressed faster 
than other adversary proceedings under other sections of the Code). 
 125. 11 U.S.C. § 707(a)(1); see also In re Higbee, 58 B.R. 71, 72 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 
1986) (denying the debtor’s voluntary motion to dismiss, which the debtor claimed 
to have filed to maximize the amount the creditors would recover, because the 
personal injury action the debtor initially valued at $2,000 at the time of filing was 
later believed to be worth in excess of $200,000 even though the debtor offered to 
settle in a way beneficial to the creditors); S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 34, 77–80 (1978), 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5820, 5863–66 (maintaining that although the 
bankruptcy system serves to provide debtors with a fresh start, the Code provides 
creditors with other remedies that protect their interests and promote full or partial 
repayment). 
 126. In re Motaharnia, 215 B.R. at 69–72 (considering, inter alia, the timeliness of 
the motion to dismiss, whether the debts were “primarily consumer debts,” whether 
granting relief would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of Chapter 7, and the 
effect of dismissal when the debtor is unable to pay to determine whether to dismiss 
the debtor’s case). 
 127. See In re Khan, 172 B.R. 613, 620 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1994) (explaining that 
under § 102(3), the words “includes” and “including” are not limiting and therefore 
permit the bankruptcy court to dismiss a Chapter 7 case for causes other than those 
enumerated under § 707(a)); supra note 41 and accompanying text (quoting the 
Senate Report issued during the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978). 
 128. See Kimlinger & Wassweiler, supra note 15, at 96–97 (arguing that causes for 
dismissal under § 707(a) must be restricted to those consistent with the technical and 
procedural causes enumerated in the section). 
 129. See infra note 230 and accompanying text (discussing two cases in which the 
court granted dismissal for causes outside of those enumerated in § 707(a)). 
 130. See Kimlinger & Wassweiler, supra note 15, at 62 (arguing that bad faith as 
cause for dismissal “is a legal fiction used as a vehicle to exclude unscrupulous 
debtors from the bankruptcy forum”). 
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distinct analyses.  Under the canons of statutory construction, courts 
are required to construe provisions consistent with one another 
without creating superfluity, and specific provisions must take 
precedence over general provisions.131  While the objective provisions 
under § 707(a) are more generally defined, § 707(b) allows the court 
to dismiss a case if granting relief would constitute an abuse of the 
bankruptcy system132 or if the debtor filed in bad faith.133  For cases 
that do not involve “primarily consumer debts,” the court’s analysis 
under § 707(a) should only concern the debtor’s compliance with 
the technical and procedural requirements and should exclude any 
consideration of the debtor’s financial means, which would be 
duplicative of the purpose of § 707(b).134 
This proposed elimination of bad faith dismissals under § 707(a) 
raises the concern that a debtor who filed in bad faith will be granted 
undue bankruptcy relief because he does not have “primarily 
consumer debts,” which are required for a creditor or trustee to have 
standing to move to dismiss the case under § 707(b).135  Despite these 
                                                 
 131. See Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 406 (1980) (holding that where both 
a specific and general statute address the same subject matter, the specific provision 
takes precedence, regardless of the order of enactment); In re Khan, 172 B.R. at 625 
(“Individual creditors or the trustee can seek more particularized redress under 
§§ 522, 523, or 727, without the detriment of losing the centralized remedy of 
administration of assets that dismissal would otherwise cause.” (quoting In re Lang,  
5 B.R. 371, 375 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980)); see also Helvering v. Credit Alliance Corp., 
316 U.S. 107, 112 (1942) (requiring two sections to be read as consistent and not 
conflicting). 
 132. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b); see Robert J. Landry III, Viability of Bad-Faith Dismissals 
Under § 707(a), 27 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1, 48 (2008) (asserting that dismissal motions 
based on the debtor’s bad faith should be brought under § 707(b) and be confined 
within those provisions). 
 133. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3) (2006); see 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 121, 
¶ 707.03[2], at 707–20  (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 15th ed. rev. 
2009) (explaining that Congress enacted § 707(b) to add bad faith as a consideration 
in determining whether to dismiss a case under § 707(b) and did not intend § 707(a) 
to serve that purpose). 
 134. See S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 94 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5880 
(listing the technical and procedural causes for dismissal under § 707(a) and 
explicitly stating that a debtor’s ability to pay debts is irrelevant to a § 707(a) 
inquiry); H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 380 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 
6336 (“This section authorizes the court to dismiss a liquidation case only for cause . 
. . [but] does not contemplate, however, that the ability of the debtor to repay his 
debts in whole or in part constitutes adequate cause for dismissal.  To permit 
dismissal on the ground would be to enact a non-uniform mandatory Chapter 13, in 
lieu of the remedy of bankruptcy.” (emphasis added)); see also Kimlinger & 
Wassweiler, supra note 15, at 72 (“[D]ebtor misconduct should be analyzed under 
the provision which specifically corresponds to that type of misconduct, and should 
not be analyzed under a more general provision which penalizes the debtor for 
‘cause.’” (citing In re Khan, 172 B.R. at 624)). 
 135. See Kimlinger & Wassweiler, supra note 15, at 81–82 (discussing two cases in 
which the court refused to dismiss the bankruptcy petitions because the debtors were 
not truly needy and appeared to be capable of repaying their debts). 
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concerns, even if the petition is remotely meritorious, each debtor is 
due a hearing because in filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy he has 
relinquished his property in exchange for a “fresh start.”136   
A successful filing indicates that the debtor has passed both the initial 
procedural inquiry under § 707(a) and the means test, and if the 
debtor acts in violation of the Code, other sections are available to 
protect the integrity of the bankruptcy system and provide remedies 
to creditors and trustees.137   
B. The Code Contains Alternative Remedies that Maintain the Integrity of 
the Bankruptcy System and Provide Safeguards to Creditors and Trustees 
The proposed elimination of bad faith as cause for dismissal under 
§ 707(a) is further supported by the alternative remedies provided in 
the Code that also protect against abusive filings.138  Sections 303(i), 
305, 523, 548, 707(b), and 727 are among the sections through which 
creditors and trustees may raise objections to a debtor’s attempt to 
discharge his debt.139  As noted, based on Congress’ continued 
omission of bad faith as an enumerated cause for dismissal under 
§ 707(a) and the BAPCPA’s clarification and expansion of the 
§ 707(b) bad faith inquiry,140 the allowance of bad faith dismissals 
under § 707(a) and imposition of a good faith filing requirement are 
unfounded.  Upholding a bad faith analysis under § 707(a) would 
therefore be duplicative because the analysis is already conducted 
under § 707(b).141 
                                                 
 136. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text (explaining that a “fresh start” 
should be afforded only to an “honest but unfortunate debtor”). 
 137. See infra Part II.B (discussing the alternative remedies contained in the Code 
that also protect the integrity of the bankruptcy system). 
 138. See Neary v. Padilla (In re Padilla), 222 F.3d 1184, 1191–92 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(highlighting four provisions affording protections to creditors and trustees by 
allowing them to object to the discharge of debt in circumstances of fraud and 
misrepresentation:  11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2)(A), (c)(1), intentional transfer or 
concealment of property with the intent of defrauding the creditor, id. § 727(a)(2), 
(c)(1), substantial abuse, id. § 707(b), and in the existence of “cause,” § 707(a)). 
 139. E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2) (denying discharge to a debtor who has converted, 
transferred, or destroyed property in an attempt to avoid collections of debt by the 
creditors). 
 140. Id. § 707(b)(3); see also Culhane & White, supra note 45, at 668–71 (detailing 
the purpose and functions of all seven subsections of § 707(b)). 
 141. Additionally, courts have noted that a determination of the existence of bad 
faith may hinder an analysis under § 707(a) and thus reject the “bad faith” label.   
In re Horan, 304 B.R. 42, 45 n.4 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2004) (noting that the “bad faith” 
label impedes the § 707(a) analysis and may have led some courts to erroneously 
require the petitioner to sufficiently prove the existence of good faith to be eligible 
to file for bankruptcy, rather than impose the burden of proving the petitioner filed 
in bad faith on the party moving for dismissal). 
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Among the alternative remedies in the Code, § 727 imposes the 
most severe and drastic measure.  If any of the nine enumerated 
conditions are present, the creditor or trustee may petition the court 
to deny discharge of all of the debtor’s debts.142  These conditions 
prohibit the debtor from engaging in misconduct, which includes 
concealing property, falsifying information, knowingly making 
fraudulent claims or offers, and failing to satisfactorily explain any 
loss or deficiency of assets.143 
Section 523(a) affords a less powerful remedy through which 
creditors can except their individual debt from discharge pursuant to 
the listed exceptions.144  These exceptions focus on remedying 
“specific evils” that harm particular creditors and take precedence 
over providing a “fresh start” to an “honest but unfortunate 
debtor.”145  Among the debts excepted from discharge under § 523(a) 
are debts for money, property, or services obtained through fraud, 
willful or malicious injury by the debtor to another entity, certain tax 
debts, debts incurred during a divorce or separation, and debts that 
were not discharged in a prior bankruptcy case.146 
Additionally, under § 303(i), if the court dismisses an involuntary 
bankruptcy petition147 without the consent of the petitioners or the 
debtor, the petitioners must pay the debtor costs or reasonable 
attorney’s fees.148  More importantly, if the court determines that the 
involuntary petition was filed in bad faith, the petitioners must pay 
                                                 
 142. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1)–(9); e.g., Boroff v. Tully (In re Tully), 818 F.2d 106, 
110–12 (1st Cir. 1987) (denying discharge because the debtor failed to include 
certain assets in schedules that were filed under oath). 
 143. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1)–(9). 
 144. Id. § 523; see infra notes 202–204 and accompanying text (arguing that the 
motions to dismiss were improperly granted as the individual debts could have been 
discharged under § 523, which would have avoided total denial of bankruptcy relief 
to the debtor); see also Richardo I. Kilpatrick, Selected Creditor Issues Under the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 817, 
830–31 (2005) (highlighting debts that are presumed to be nondischargeable).   
But see U.S. Trustee v. Lacrosse (In re Lacrosse), 244 B.R. 583, 589 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 
1999) (granting dismissal under § 707(a) on the basis of fraudulent conduct and 
lavish lifestyles, which are examples of misconduct covered under § 523). 
 145. See Kimlinger & Wassweiler, supra note 15, at 74 (noting that debtors whose 
conduct contradicts the policies served by § 523 will be denied a “fresh start”). 
 146. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)–(19). 
 147. Under § 303, an involuntary bankruptcy case may be “commenced only 
under Chapter 7 or 11 of this title, and only against a person, except a farmer, family 
farmer, or a corporation that is not a moneyed, business, or commercial corporation, 
that may be a debtor under the chapter under which such case is commenced.”  Id. 
§ 303. 
 148. Id. § 303(i)(1)(A)–(B); e.g., Higgins v. Vortex Fishing Sys., Inc., 379 F.3d 701, 
706, 708 (9th Cir. 2004) (awarding attorneys’ fees and costs related to the litigation 
regardless of whether the petition was filed in bad faith). 
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punitive damages or any damages proximately caused by the filing.149  
Because the court may award damages for dismissals of bad faith 
filings under § 303(i), granting bad faith dismissals under § 707(a) is 
unnecessary and duplicative.150 
Other sections that protect the integrity of the bankruptcy system 
and provide safeguards to the parties involved are §§ 305 and 548.  
Section 305 allows the court to dismiss or suspend a case if the 
interests of the creditors and debtor would be better served through 
either of those remedial actions.151  Section 548 protects creditors and 
trustees by prohibiting the debtor from transferring any interests with 
the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor 
is indebted and also limits charitable contributions to a specific 
percentage of the debtor’s income, unless consistent with past 
donations.152 
In light of maintaining the integrity of the bankruptcy system and 
Code, debtor misconduct should be analyzed under the provision 
that specifically addresses the misconduct.153  There is a need for a 
stricter application of the Code to uphold the plain meaning and 
individual purpose of each section, and courts should limit dismissals 
under § 707(a) to cases involving violations of the technical and 
procedural requirements. 
                                                 
 149. E.g., Adell v. John Richards Homes Bldg. Co. (In re John Richards Homes 
Bldg. Co.), 439 F.3d 248 (6th Cir. 2006) (dismissing the involuntary Chapter 7 
petition filed in bad faith and awarding punitive damages of two million dollars). 
 150. Under the canons of statutory construction, where Congress imposed 
remedies under one condition and not the other, the inclusion in one provision and 
exclusion in the other provision was purposeful and intentional.  See supra Part II.A 
(analyzing the different purposes intended for §§ 707(a) and 707(b) and arguing 
against the current duplicative application of a bad faith inquiry under both 
provisions). 
 151. 11 U.S.C. § 305; see In re Whitby, 51 B.R. 184, 185–86 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 
1985) (denying the creditor’s motion to dismiss because the interests of the debtor 
would not be better served by dismissal, but granting the motion to suspend the 
bankruptcy petition because suspension would better serve the interests of all parties 
involved); see also S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 36 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5787, 5822 (allowing courts to dismiss cases in which out-of-court arrangements are 
being discussed by the parties under § 305). 
 152. 11 U.S.C. § 548; e.g., Hayes v. Palm Seeding Partners (In re Agric. Research & 
Tech. Group, Inc.), 916 F.2d 528, 539–40 (9th Cir. 1990) (denying the debtor’s 
motion to avoid transfers upon finding that the debtor made transfers to investors 
with fraudulent intent). 
 153. See supra note 131 and accompanying text (arguing that the most specific 
provision should be applied to address misconduct in a case). 
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C. The Significant Differences Between the Statutory Text, Purpose, and 
Nature of Liquidation and Reorganization Should Preclude the Transfer of 
the Good Faith Inquiry from Reorganization Cases to Liquidation Cases 
Although the Code imposes no good faith filing requirement on 
Chapter 7 liquidation or Chapters 11 or 13 reorganization cases,154 
courts have created this prerequisite in liquidation cases by 
analogizing to reorganization cases.  They have transferred the 
explicit requirement that debtors in reorganization propose a 
repayment plan in good faith to apply to debtors in liquidation.155  
Lack of good faith is only sufficient cause for courts to deny 
confirmation of reorganization payment plans.156  The Code addresses, 
in two separate sections, the good faith inquiry conducted prior to 
the confirmation of the reorganization plan and the inquiry of 
whether cause exists to dismiss or convert the reorganization case.157  
These provisions should not be merged or transferred to permit 
courts to dismiss cases for bad faith under § 707(a).158 
The statutory text that allows courts to grant dismissal or 
conversion of a case for cause under each chapter further rejects the 
cross-application of the provisions.159  Like the enumerated causes 
under § 707(a), the causes for dismissal or conversion of a 
reorganization case are technical and procedural in nature and also 
include unreasonable delay by the debtor, nonpayment of fees, and 
                                                 
 154. The Code imposes a good faith filing requirement only for Chapter 9 
bankruptcy cases.  11 U.S.C. § 921(c). 
 155. See, e.g., In re Sky Group Int’l, Inc., 108 B.R. 86, 90 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989) 
(citing the holding in In re Setzer, 47 B.R. 340 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985), in which the 
court dismissed a Chapter 13 petition on the ground that it was filed in bad faith, to 
dismiss a Chapter 7 petition filed in bad faith but without discussing the differences 
between Chapter 7 and 13 bankruptcy). 
 156. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129, 1325.  These sections both state that a court will confirm a 
plan if “the plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by 
law” and this good faith inquiry is left to the discretion of the bankruptcy court.  Id.; 
see also Ravenot v. Rimgale (In re Rimgale), 669 F.2d 426, 431 n.14 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(noting that the good faith inquiry is done on a case-by-case basis and listing factors 
applied in the court’s assessment). 
 157. For Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, conversion and dismissal is addressed in 
§ 1112 and confirmation of the reorganization plan is addressed in § 1129.  11 U.S.C. 
§§ 1112, 1129.  For Chapter 13 cases, they are addressed in §§ 1307 and 1325, 
respectively.  Id. §§ 1307, 1325. 
 158. See Kimlinger & Wassweiler, supra note 15, at 98 (emphasizing the 
importance of maintaining the integrity of each provision of the Code). 
 159. See Neary v. Padilla (In re Padilla), 222 F.3d 1184, 1193 (9th Cir. 2000)  
(“The Bankruptcy Code’s language and the protracted relationship between 
reorganization debtors and their creditors lead us to conclude that bad faith per se 
can properly constitute ‘cause’ for dismissal of a Chapter 11 or Chapter 13, but not 
of a Chapter 7 petition under § 707(a).”). 
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failure to provide information or attend meetings.160  Dismissal or 
conversion is granted in reorganization unless the court finds that it 
would not be in the best interests of the creditors and the estate.161 
The purpose and nature of reorganization further indicates that 
the Code’s expressed inclusion of a good faith inquiry for 
reorganization cases and exclusion for liquidation cases were 
intentional.162  While the debtor in liquidation surrenders his non-
exempt assets in return for a “fresh start,” the debtor in 
reorganization keeps his assets while reorganizing his debts and 
avoids complete liquidation of his entire estate.163  Because the debtor 
is afforded this privilege, the interests of the creditors and the estate 
are heightened, justifying the requirement that the debtor propose 
his reorganization plan in good faith.164 
The control over the debtor’s property during reorganization and 
the post-filing relationship between the debtor and his creditors 
further distinguish liquidation cases from reorganization cases.165   
In liquidation, the debtor-creditor relationship is terminated because 
the debtor essentially “throws in the towel” by surrendering total 
control of his property to the trustee who liquidates and distributes 
the proceeds to the creditors.166  On the other hand, the debtor-
creditor relationship must be preserved in reorganization because 
the debtor maintains possession of his assets while formulating and 
                                                 
 160. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 707(a) (listing unreasonable delay by the debtor, 
nonpayment of fees, and failure to provide information or attend meetings as causes 
for dismissal), with id. § 1112 (containing sixteen causes for dismissal, including the 
causes contained in § 707(a)), and id. § 1307 (providing eleven causes for dismissal, 
including the causes contained in § 707(a)). 
 161. Id. §§ 1112(b), 1307(c); e.g., In re Forest Hill Funeral Home & Mem’l Park, 
364 B.R. 808, 822 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 2007) (citing In re Muskogee Envtl. 
Conservation Co., 236 B.R. 57, 69 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1999)) (finding that dismissal, 
rather than conversion was warranted). 
 162. In re Tallman, 397 B.R. 451, 456 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2008), rev’d, No. 1:08-CV-
309-TS, 2009 WL 3245206 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2009). 
 163. DUFF, supra note 30, at 6, 22; see NMSBPCSLDHB v. Integrated Telecom 
Express, Inc. (In re Integrated Telecom Express, Inc.), 384 F.3d 108, 119 (3d Cir. 
2004) (noting that reorganization permits debtors to avoid “the consequences of 
economic dismemberment and liquidation”). 
 164. See Kimlinger & Wassweiler, supra note 15, at 65 n.18 (detailing the benefits 
afforded to debtors who file for reorganization bankruptcy). 
 165. See Neary v. Padilla (In re Padilla), 222 F.3d 1184, 1193 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(discussing the differences between liquidation and reorganization cases). 
 166. See In re RIS Inv. Group, Inc., 298 B.R. 848, 852 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2003) 
(stating that “as the debtor is willing to surrender all of its assets, regardless of 
whether debtor’s motive was grounded in good faith, the debtor is entitled to 
Chapter 7 protection”). 
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proposing a payment plan to reorganize his debts and contractual 
relationships.167 
The similarities in the scope of the provisions applying to dismissal 
or conversion for each chapter of bankruptcy, along with the 
differences in the debtor-creditor relationship and the debtor’s 
control over the property, therefore call into question the validity of 
the cross-application of the Code provisions.  An analysis of the 
statutory construction of § 707 provides no support for bad faith 
dismissals of Chapter 7 petitions under §707(a). 
III. THE ALLOWANCE OF BAD FAITH DISMISSALS CONSTITUTES AN 
ABUSE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND AN IMPROPER APPLICATION OF 
THE CODE 
“[I]t is the duty of a Judge to apply the laws as written by Congress, 
rather than to substitute personal abstract concepts of justice and 
morality, to the cases it hears.”168  Despite the amendments to the 
Code, courts have continued to read in a good faith filing 
requirement for cases under Chapter 7 and follow cases that granted 
bad faith dismissals while applying the Code prior to the enactment 
of the BAPCPA (“pre-BAPCPA”).169  Congress’ repeated omission of 
bad faith from § 707(a) should indicate that the omission was 
purposeful and for good reason.170  Unfortunately, there remains an 
excessive and unwarranted use of judicial discretion by courts that 
continue to grant bad faith dismissals under § 707(a).171 
                                                 
 167. See In re Padilla, 222 F.3d at 1192–93 (holding that bad faith is per se cause for 
dismissal of Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy under § 1112 and § 1325, 
respectively); Marsch v. Marsch (In re Marsch), 36 F.3d 825, 828–29 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(affirming the bankruptcy court’s for cause dismissal of the debtor’s Chapter 11 
petition pursuant to § 1112(b) on the grounds of bad faith). 
 168. In re Goulding, 79 B.R. 874, 876 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987). 
 169. See, e.g., In re Privada, Inc., No. 07-10940 FRM, 2008 WL 4692372, at *5 
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. Oct. 22, 2008) (relying on In re Little Creek Dev. Co., 779 F.2d 
1068, 1071 (5th Cir. 1986), to support the proposition that bad faith can be a cause 
for dismissal of a Chapter 7 case under § 707(a) on the reasoning that “every 
bankruptcy statute since 1898 has incorporated literally, or by judicial interpretation, 
a standard of good faith for the commencement, prosecution and confirmation of 
bankruptcy proceedings”). 
 170. See Landry, supra note 132, at 48 (agreeing with commentators who maintain 
that the inclusion of bad faith as grounds for dismissal under § 707(b) defeats the 
imposition of a good faith filing requirement under § 707(a)); see also Kimlinger & 
Wassweiler, supra note 15, at 63–64 (“Where Congress intended to impose a good 
faith requirement it specifically did so.”). 
 171. See, e.g., Sec. Am., Inc. v. Tallman (In re Tallman), No. 1:08-CV-309-TS, 2009 
WL 3245206, at *7 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2009) (following the majority of federal 
courts, which have recognized that bad faith constitutes cause for dismissal under 
§ 707(a), and applying the “totality of the circumstances” analysis to determine 
whether the debtor acted in bad faith), rev’g 397 B.R. 451, 455 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 
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A. Despite the Enactment of the BAPCPA, Courts Have Continued to 
Improperly Follow Cases that Misinterpreted § 707(a) and Granted Bad Faith 
Dismissals 
It should first be noted that even prior to the enactment of the 
BAPCPA, the allowance of bad faith dismissals under § 707(a) was 
improper.  In In re Zick, the Sixth Circuit held that the addition of 
§ 707(b) in 1984 was instructive as to the purpose and function of 
§ 707(a) and correctly held that § 707(b) served as an additional 
restraint on the debtor’s ability to receive bankruptcy relief.172  The 
court, however, went beyond looking to the addition of § 707(b) as 
mere instruction of the scope of § 707(a) and erroneously held that, 
like § 707(b), § 707(a) also afforded bankruptcy courts leeway to deal 
equitably with abusive debtors.173 
In granting dismissals for a debtor’s lack of good faith, the Sixth 
Circuit relied heavily on the importance of maintaining the purpose 
of the bankruptcy system to afford relief to the “honest but 
unfortunate debtor.”174  Although bankruptcy courts are courts of 
equity, they do not serve to create or amend the Code to ensure the 
most equitable outcome but instead exist to interpret and enforce its 
provisions within the confines of the Code’s purpose and language.175  
Further, as discussed above, dismissals for bad faith under § 707(a) 
constitute a total disregard of statutory construction176 and improperly 
broaden the scope of the section by placing undue emphasis on the 
                                                 
2008) (detailing the different perceptions of what bad faith is in the context of a 
petition for liquidation relief). 
 172. Indus. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Zick (In re Zick), 931 F.2d 1124, 1128 (6th Cir. 1991) 
(citing In re Krohn, 886 F.2d 123, 126 (6th Cir. 1989)). 
 173. Id. at 1129; see Kimlinger & Wassweiler, supra note 15, at 88 (arguing that 
courts craft the implicit good faith filing requirement to “weed out” unsuitable 
debtors and that dismissing cases under § 707(a) imposes a harsher penalty for 
debtors engaging in misconduct than warranted under the Code). 
 174. See In re Zick, 931 F.2d at 1128–29 (adopting the conclusions of previous cases 
that, although not explicitly stated in the Code, good faith is an inherent 
requirement for receiving bankruptcy relief). 
 175. See Phar-Mor, Inc., v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. (In re Phar-Mor, Inc.) 166 B.R. 
57, 61 (W.D. Pa. 1994) (“This section of the Code authorizes a court to use its equity 
powers to fashion such orders as are necessary to further the substantive provisions of 
the [Code] . . . .  However, while the grant of authority is broad, a court may not 
create substantive rights in favor of a debtor that are in addition to the rights 
bestowed by the Code if such rights do not also exist outside of bankruptcy law.”  
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).  But see Gen. Motors Acceptance 
Corp. v. Rose (In re Rose), 21 B.R. 272, 276 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1982) (“Bankruptcy 
matters are . . . inherently proceedings in equity and must foster equitable results.” 
(citation omitted)); supra note 56 (noting bankruptcy courts’ heavy reliance on 
equitable principles to support bad faith dismissals). 
 176. See supra Part II (providing a comprehensive analysis of the statutory 
construction of § 707). 
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word “including.”177  Bad faith dismissals also ignore the longstanding 
congressional intent that § 707(a) “does not contemplate . . . that the 
ability of the debtor to repay his debts in whole or in part constitutes 
adequate cause for dismissal.”178  In addition to the debtor’s ability to 
pay, other considerations, such as misconduct and improper motive, 
should not be included in a court’s analysis under § 707(a) because 
they fall outside of its purview.179 
Despite the enactment of the BAPCPA, courts have continued to 
read in an implicit good faith filing requirement and grant bad faith 
dismissals under § 707(a).180  These courts have applied a number of 
multifactor, subjective tests—including the Sixth Circuit’s smell 
test181—to determine whether the filing was made in bad faith under a 
§ 707(a) analysis.182  They appear to have given little weight to the 
                                                 
 177. See In re Zick, 931 F.2d at 1126–27 (rationalizing that the word “including” is 
not a limiting word and that § 707(a) is a “general” provision that allows bad faith 
dismissals). 
 178. Id. at 1127 n.3.  Congress stated that “[t]o permit dismissal on that ground 
would be to enact a non-uniform mandatory chapter 13, in lieu of the remedy of 
bankruptcy.”  S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 94 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 
5880; H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 380 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6336; 
see also Huckfeldt v. Huckfeldt (In re Huckfeldt), 39 F.3d 829, 831 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(noting that the “[a]bility to pay is the primary inquiry under § 707(b),” not 
§ 707(a)); In re Motaharnia, 215 B.R. 63, 68 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1997) (stating that 
Congress never intended for courts to consider a debtor’s ability to pay part or all of 
its debts when considering “cause” under § 707(a)); In re Goulding, 79 B.R. 874, 876 
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987) (“It is difficult to contemplate how Congress could more 
emphatically have stated that the debtor’s net worth or future prospects is not ‘cause’ 
as the word is used in Section 707 for dismissal.”). 
 179. See Neary v. Padilla (In re Padilla), 222 F.3d 1184, 1193 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(maintaining that debtors are entitled to Chapter 7 protection as long as they are 
willing to surrender all of their assets, regardless of whether their motives in filing 
were in good faith); Kimlinger & Wassweiler, supra note 15, at 78–79 (arguing that 
some courts have adopted an overly expansive definition of bad faith and merely 
require a finding of the debtor’s ability to repay the debt, while others have required 
misconduct, improper motive, or dishonesty in addition to the ability to repay the 
debt for a finding of bad faith). 
 180. E.g., In re Marino, 388 B.R. 679, 683–84 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2008) (dismissing 
the debtor’s Chapter 7 case for lack of good faith based on the lack of sudden 
financial disaster, the debtor’s knowledge that attorney’s fees were accruing and that 
the law firm expected payment from her equitable distribution recovery, and 
debtor’s unwillingness to repay the attorney’s fees exceeding $250,000 because she 
allegedly did not want to withdraw funds from her IRA, despite the law firm’s offer to 
settle the claim for $20,000). 
 181. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (describing the smell test). 
 182. See In re Parker, No. 08-04126-8-ATS, 2009 WL 249884, at *2 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 
Feb. 3, 2009) (maintaining that the lack of good faith can constitute cause for 
dismissal under § 707(a) and applying a totality of circumstances analysis to 
determine whether to dismiss the case under § 707(a)).  In In re Parker, the 
bankruptcy court used a fourteen-factor test applied in cases decided prior to the 
BAPCPA that focuses on the intent of the debtor and on promoting equity in the 
bankruptcy system.  Id. at *2.  Compare In re Griffieth, 209 B.R. 823, 827 (Bankr. 
N.D.N.Y. 1996) (applying a six-factor test to determine whether the filing was done in 
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amendments of § 707(b) and have opined that courts maintain 
discretion to consider the debtor’s monthly income and expenses 
along with other factors to determine the existence of good faith.183  
The continued broad reading of § 707(a) is an abuse of judicial 
discretion, especially in light of the BAPCPA and the addition of the 
means test, through which Congress provided further clarification 
regarding its intent to limit judicial discretion.184 
A prime example of a case where a court misapplied § 707(a) is  
In re Lombardo.185  The debtor sought bankruptcy relief to discharge 
her debts, which primarily consisted of attorney’s fees incurred 
during a contentious divorce proceeding.186  The debtor retained a 
law firm pursuant to a Marital Retainer Agreement but exhausted the 
initial retainer, ending the law firm’s obligation to provide any 
additional legal services.187  The law firm agreed to take a security 
interest in property in lieu of immediate payment188 and also agreed 
to waive a portion of the outstanding debt, reduce the monthly 
installments, and continue performing legal services despite the 
debtor’s repeated late payments and even nonpayment of fees.189 
                                                 
bad faith), with In re O’Brien, 328 B.R. 669, 675 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2005) (applying a 
fourteen-factor test to make the same inquiry). 
 183. See Perlin v. Hitachi Capital Am. Corp. (In re Perlin), 497 F.3d 364, 367 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (rejecting the bankruptcy court’s reasoning that because a presumption of 
abuse arises when the debtor with primarily consumer debts petitions for bankruptcy 
with sufficient income to repay his debt, a consideration of the debtor’s income and 
expenses should not exist in the court’s determination of whether to grant dismissal 
under § 707(a)); see also In re Parker, 2009 WL 249884, at *1–2 (disregarding the 
amendments by applying a totality of the circumstances approach in an analysis 
under § 707(a) despite the fact that the debtor’s income exceeds the state median 
income, allowing for a presumption of abuse, and erroneously applying the 
substantial abuse standard of the pre-BAPCPA Code, as opposed to the standard of 
mere abuse under the amended Code to dismiss the case under § 707(b)). 
 184. See A. Jay Cristol & Cheryl Kaplan, 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(a)(iii):  Does It Mean 
What It Says And Say What It Means?, 19 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 2 (2008) (arguing 
that the amended § 707(b) limits judicial discretion by instituting an objective 
calculation to determine whether the debtor has sufficient disposable income to 
repay at least a portion of his unsecured non-priority debts); Rafael I. Pardo, 
Eliminating the Judicial Function in Consumer Bankruptcy, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 471, 473 
(2007) (noting that the means test “sought to divest bankruptcy judges of their 
gatekeeping discretion” but that the BAPCPA has blurred the judicial and 
administrative functions of the bankruptcy court). 
 185. 370 B.R. 506 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 186. Id. at 507–08.  The attorney’s fees constituted eighty-seven percent of the 
debtor’s total debt.  Id. at 507.  The debtor also wanted to discharge seven other 
general unsecured claims consisting of credit card debt totaling $8,409.63.  Id.  
 187. Id. at 508. 
 188. Id. at 509.  The debtor persuaded the law firm to continue representing her 
in the divorce proceeding.  Id. at 508–09.  It was unlikely that the debtor would have 
been able to retain new counsel willing to charge a rate comparable to the law firm’s 
$250 hourly rate.  Id. at 508. 
 189. Id. at 509.  The law firm waived $9,584.09 and reduced the monthly 
installments from $400 to $300.  Id.  Additionally, after offering the debtor a reduced 
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The law firm moved to dismiss the bankruptcy case under § 707(a) 
on the grounds that the debtor filed the petition in bad faith to 
thwart its attempts at recovery, that the debtor was able to repay the 
outstanding debt, and that granting relief would be unfair in light of 
the law firm’s offer to substantially reduce the outstanding debt.190  
Relying heavily on pre-BAPCPA cases and giving little weight to the 
BAPCPA,191 the court performed a bad faith inquiry by applying 
multifactor tests and found that the debtor’s conduct met several 
factors that suggested that the filing was made in bad faith.192  
Although the law firm failed to establish cause justifying dismissal, the 
court still granted dismissal under § 707(a) on the grounds that the 
debtor filed the bankruptcy petition solely to thwart the law firm’s 
attempts to recover the unpaid attorney’s fees.193 
Another case where a court abused its discretion in applying 
§ 707(a) was In re Marino,194 a case factually similar to In re Lombardo.  
In In re Marino, the debtor filed for bankruptcy relief to discharge the 
attorney’s fees incurred during a marital and equitable distribution, 
as well as her credit card debt, a personal loan, accounting fees, and a 
student loan.195  Unlike the debtor in In re Lombardo, the debtor in  
In re Marino had already paid off roughly half of the outstanding legal 
fees and had more consumer debt and less income.196  After applying 
a multifactor test,197 the court determined that the debtor did not file 
in good faith and dismissed the case.198  It found that the debtor filed 
for bankruptcy to frustrate the law firm’s attempts to recover the 
outstanding debt and that granting relief would be unfair because the 
                                                 
fee of $20,000 and notifying the debtor that it would be applying to the state court to 
perfect her security interest in a portion of her ex-husband’s 401(k) plan, the debtor 
offered to pay a mere $10,000 to satisfy the outstanding legal fees.  Id. at 509–10.  
Before the law firm filed the application, the debtor filed for bankruptcy relief under 
Chapter 7.  Id. at 510. 
 190. Id. at 507–08.  The law firm offered a reduced fee of $20,000 to satisfy the 
outstanding debt, forgiving $36,479.95.  Id. at 510. 
 191. See id. at 511 (making no reference to the BAPCPA and citing cases applying 
the pre-BAPCPA Code). 
 192. See id. at 512 (applying the six-factor test utilized in In re Griffieth, 209 B.R. 
823 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1996), and the fourteen factor test applied in In re O’Brien, 
328 B.R. 669 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2005)). 
 193. Id. at 512.  The debtor obtained $30,400 of her ex-husband’s 401(k), which is 
exempt from creditors under § 522, which the court asserted that she would use for 
her own personal benefit instead of repaying her creditors.  Id. at 513.  Additionally, 
the law firm decided not to “abandon the [d]ebtor during [her] hour of need,” 
despite the reduction of debt and the debtor’s occasional late and even nonpayment 
of fees.  Id. at 512. 
 194. 388 B.R. 679 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2008). 
 195. Id. at 681. 
 196. Id. at 683. 
 197. Id. at 682. 
 198. Id. at 684. 
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law firm ensured that the debtor received $250,000 in IRA accounts, 
which are protected in bankruptcy proceedings.199 
Although both courts found that the debtors were not “honest but 
unfortunate debtors” worthy of bankruptcy relief, dismissal under 
§ 707(a) was improper in both cases.  The debtors may have filed for 
bankruptcy to frustrate the law firms’ attempts to recover the 
outstanding legal fees, but this finding is insufficient to justify 
dismissal under § 707(a), even though under the laws of equity, the 
law firms were entitled to recovery.200  In In re Lombardo, the law firm 
did not have standing to move for dismissal under § 707(b) because 
the debtor’s income fell below the median income level.201  The 
court, however, should not have conveniently turned to its 
counterpart, § 707(a), to grant dismissal because cause did not exist 
to justify dismissal.  Instead, in both cases, the creditors could have 
moved to deny discharge of the attorney’s fees under § 523.202  The 
debtor’s student loans in In re Marino could also have been excepted 
from discharge under § 523.203  Both debtors should not have been 
denied bankruptcy relief under § 707(a) as it appears that they met 
all of the technical and procedural requirements of a Chapter 7 
bankruptcy filing.204 
The continued broad reading of § 707(a) is an abuse of the Code 
provisions because it permits creditors to take the shortest and 
cheapest way to recover outstanding debt.205  Unlike most 
proceedings, motions to dismiss do not require a filing fee and are 
heard within a short period of time, which may explain creditors’ 
                                                 
 199. Id. at 683. 
 200. See supra note 173 and accompanying text (arguing that courts have 
improperly read in a good faith filing requirement for Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases to 
eliminate debtors who may have filed in bad faith). 
 201. See Landry, supra note 132, at 49 (referring to the debtor’s Official Form 22A, 
which detailed the debtor’s financial situation and indicated that she was a consumer 
debtor whose income fell below the median income of her state of residence). 
 202. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19)(B)(iii) (2006) (excepting attorney’s fees from 
discharge); see supra notes 144–146 and accompanying text (discussing the 
application of § 523). 
 203. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (excepting any educational loan unless it would 
impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s dependents). 
 204. Neither opinion makes any mention of either debtor’s failure to meet any of 
the technical or procedural requirements of a Chapter 7 petition.  See In re Marino, 
388 B.R. 679 at 684; In re Lombardo, 370 B.R. 506, 514 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2007).  After 
the petition in In re Lombardo was dismissed, the parties resolved the dispute through 
settlement, upon which the court vacated the dismissal of the case.  See Landry, supra 
note 132, at 49 (citing the bankruptcy court order granting the motion to vacate and 
noting that the BAPCPA may not have completely eliminated bad faith dismissals of 
consumer bankruptcy cases). 
 205. See Kimlinger & Wassweiler, supra note 15, at 72–73 (noting that motions to 
dismiss may be heard within ten days of service while several months could pass 
before adversary proceedings are heard). 
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general preference for filing them.206  Congress intended to reduce 
judicial discretion rather than afford courts more leeway and 
discretion in interpreting the Code to relieve increasing docket 
pressures.207  As such, cases in which the court conducted factual 
inquiries and granted bad faith dismissals under § 707(a) should no 
longer be upheld. 
B. All Courts Should Properly Apply § 707(a) by No Longer Granting Bad 
Faith Dismissals Under that Subsection 
The Ninth Circuit in In re Padilla208 rejected the implicit good faith 
filing requirement and the bad faith dismissal under § 707(a),209 but 
only a limited number of courts outside of the Ninth Circuit have 
adopted this approach.210  These courts have found that, of the three 
lines of cases,211 the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning and rejection of the 
implicit good faith filing requirement was most persuasive.212  They 
focused on the differences in the applicable statutory text, the post-
filing debtor-creditor relationship, and the purpose or outcome of 
                                                 
 206. See id. at 72 (“One can logically assume that the proliferation of motions to 
dismiss under § 707(a) is due to the timeliness and cost effectiveness of motion 
practice versus adversary proceedings.”). 
 207. See Culhane & White, supra note 45, at 679–80, 683 (noting that the means 
test has constricted the discretion that judges are permitted to use in applying the 
different provisions of § 707(b)).  But see In re Privada, Inc., No. 07-10940 FRM, 2008 
WL 4692372, at *6 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Oct. 22, 2008) (“There is no indication that 
Congress intended . . . to restrict a bankruptcy court’s discretion in deciding motions 
to dismiss under § 707(a).”).  The court further asserted that “[t]he legislative history 
to the 2005 Act does not indicate that the modifications to § 707(b) imply anything 
about the dismissal of bankruptcy cases under § 707(a).”  Id. 
 208. 222 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 209. Id. at 1191. 
 210. E.g., In re Farkas, 343 B.R. 336, 339 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2006).  But see McDow v. 
Dudley (In re Dudley), 405 B.R. 790, 800 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2009) (holding that lack 
of good faith is sufficient cause for dismissal of a case under § 707(a)); In re 
Lombardo, 370 B.R. 506, 511 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2007) (looking to other cases in the 
Second Circuit to determine that the lack of good faith is a sufficient cause for 
dismissal under § 707(a)).  The Fourth Circuit, however, has suggested in dictum 
that bad faith should only be a consideration under § 707(b).  In re Green, 934 F.2d 
568, 571 (4th Cir. 1991). 
 211. As one court explained: 
The first line of cases states that there is no [good faith filing requirement] 
for filing a chapter 7 petition.  The second line of cases holds that 
[d]ismissal based on lack of good faith must be undertaken on an ad hoc 
basis . . . .  The third line of cases holds that, although certain actions of a 
debtor constituting cause may also be characterized as bad faith, framing the 
issue in such terms [bad faith] may tend to misdirect the inquiry away from 
the fundamental principles and purposes of Chapter 7. 
In re RIS Inv. Group, Inc., 298 B.R. 848, 851 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2003) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 212. E.g., In re Farkas, 343 B.R. at 340; In re RIS Inv. Group, Inc., 298 B.R. at 851. 
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liquidation and reorganization cases that the Ninth Circuit 
highlighted in In re Padilla.213 
Unfortunately, though some courts have explicitly stated that they 
agree with the Ninth Circuit’s holding, many of them have fallen 
short of upholding its narrow application of § 707(a).  In In re 
Linehan,214 the court appointed a guardian for the debtor who 
suffered from mental illnesses and other severe medical conditions 
for the general administration of the case.215  Because the debtor 
either refused or was unable to appear at depositions, the creditors 
moved to dismiss the case under § 707(a) on the ground that the 
debtor’s conduct in the bankruptcy proceedings was a deliberate 
attempt to frustrate their collection efforts.216  The court found that 
the creditor’s allegation of “bad faith” did not rise to the level of 
“egregious conduct”—the broader standard applied by the Sixth 
Circuit.217  Although the court denied the motion to dismiss the case 
under § 707(a) upon finding complete satisfaction of the technical 
and procedural requirements,218 the court should not have applied 
the Sixth Circuit’s standard and instead should have followed the 
Ninth Circuit’s narrow application of § 707(a) and refrained from 
any bad faith inquiry. 
Some courts have granted bad faith dismissals under § 707(a) but 
have narrowed the scope of what constitutes bad faith under the 
subsection.219  For example, although past courts have granted bad 
faith dismissals upon finding that the debtor filed for bankruptcy in 
an attempt to thwart the creditors’ collection efforts, courts have 
recently rejected such findings as an insufficient showing of bad faith 
to justify dismissal of a case.220 
                                                 
 213. In re RIS Inv. Group, Inc., 298 B.R. at 852 (citing In re Padilla, 222 F.3d at 
1193). 
 214. 326 B.R. 474 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005). 
 215. Id. at 476 (noting that the debtor had “severe coronary artery disease with 
multiple bypass surgery & stent placements, along with angiography/angioplasty . . . 
[which were] further complicated by poorly controlled diabetes, peripheral 
neuropathy and severe depression”). 
 216. Id. at 482. 
 217. Id. at 483. 
 218. Id.  
 219. See, e.g., In re Tallman, 397 B.R. 451, 454–55 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2008), rev’d, 
No. 1:08-CV-309-TS, 2009 WL 3245206 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2009) (emphasizing the 
importance of looking to the cumulative effect of all of the relevant factors in a bad 
faith inquiry and comparing such an analysis to a determination of whether a work of 
art is a masterpiece to support the proposition that a bad faith inquiry should not be 
a “mechanical recitation of factors”). 
 220. Compare In re Kane & Kane, 406 B.R. 163, 170 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009) 
(denying the creditor’s motion to dismiss despite finding that the debtor filed for 
bankruptcy in an attempt to thwart the creditor’s collection efforts), with In re Stump, 
280 B.R. 208, 214 & nn.1–2 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2002) (granting dismissal of a case 
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Courts have also interpreted the Code more strictly by applying 
provisions only in cases in which the relevant conduct is present.221   
If, for example, the debtor has satisfied all of the technical and 
procedural requirements but is guilty of conduct that excepts a debt 
from discharge under § 523, the court’s proper response should be to 
not only deny discharge of that specific debt but also deny the 
petition for dismissal under § 707(a).  Even if the creditor or trustee 
makes a strong showing that the filing was made in bad faith, the 
petition should not be dismissed under § 707 unless the debtor’s debt 
consists of “primarily consumer debts,” in which case the creditor or 
trustee would have standing to move for dismissal under § 707(b). 
In rejecting bad faith dismissals under § 707(a), courts in the Ninth 
Circuit have noted that if bad faith did constitute cause for dismissal 
under § 707(a), § 707(b) would be unnecessary.222  It would also be 
excessive and redundant if § 707(a) provided an exhaustive list of all 
causes that justified dismissal because other technical and procedural 
requirements are provided in other sections of the Code.223  More 
importantly, it would create opportunities for a debtor to find 
loopholes and exceptions to bypass § 707(a).  The non-exhaustive 
enumeration sufficiently establishes the scope of the provision.224 
For example, in In re Tiner,225 the court granted dismissal for a non-
enumerated cause that fell within the scope of § 707(a).226  The court 
held that although dismissal is explicitly warranted under § 707(a)(3) 
                                                 
upon finding that the debtor filed for bankruptcy to thwart the creditor’s collection 
efforts), and In re Collins, 250 B.R. 645, 654–55 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000) (dismissing 
the petition because the debtor filed for bankruptcy to frustrate his only creditor’s 
efforts at recovery and was unwilling to change his lifestyle to pay his debt). 
 221. See, e.g., In re Tallman, 397 B.R. at 459–60 (“Including conduct redressed by 
other portions of the Bankruptcy Code as part of the bad faith dismissal analysis 
distorts the structure Congress designed when it evaluated and created solutions to 
particular problems.”); see also supra Part II.B (emphasizing the importance of 
applying the provision that applies specifically to the misconduct present). 
 222. See In re Tiner, No. 08-42070 TM, 2008 WL 2705103, at *2–3 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 
July 1, 2008) (citing Neary v. Padilla (In re Padilla), 222 F.3d 1184, 1191–92 (9th Cir. 
2000)) (stating that the causes enumerated in § 707(a) are “illustrative and not 
exhaustive”). 
 223. See Kimlinger & Wassweiler, supra note 15, at 97 (noting that the enumerated 
causes are representative of the technical and procedural violations of the Code but 
that courts should refrain from applying § 707(a) not only to misconduct beyond its 
scope but also to misconduct more specifically addressed in other sections).  
Providing a more complete list of causes for dismissal may also be dangerous because 
any omission may be construed as an intentional omission, potentially allowing for 
the creation of loopholes to preclude dismissal in certain situations. 
 224. See In re Padilla, 222 F.3d at 1191 (defining “including” to mean “not limiting” 
and citing Huckfeldt v. Huckfeldt (In re Huckfeldt), 39 F.3d 829 (8th Cir. 1994), to 
emphasize the non-exclusivity of the enumerated causes for dismissal). 
 225. No. 08-42070 TM, 2008 WL 2705103 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. July 1, 2008). 
 226. Id. at *6. 
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if the debtor failed to meet § 521(a)(1),227 the debtor’s failure to 
satisfy its counterpart, § 521(b)(1), which required him to file a 
credit counseling certificate, also constituted cause for dismissal.228  
Because the three enumerated causes are “illustrative and not 
exhaustive,” the court properly applied § 707(a) to grant dismissal 
because the requirement under § 521(b)(1) was also technical and 
procedural in nature.229 
Other cases have also been dismissed for causes beyond the scope 
of those enumerated in § 707(a).  For example, courts have dismissed 
cases on the basis of protecting public health, safety, and well-being 
of the community.230  Courts have recognized, however, that 
extraordinary circumstances typically must be present to warrant 
dismissal under § 707(a) beyond the scope of those enumerated.231 
C. Some Courts Have Reverted to Applying the Totality of the Circumstances 
Analysis, Hampering the Movement that Bankruptcy Courts Have Made 
Towards a Proper Application of § 707(a) 
Courts continue to exhibit reluctance towards eliminating the bad 
faith inquiry from a § 707(a) analysis, especially in cases without 
“primarily consumer debts” in which § 707(b) is inapplicable.232  What 
is particularly concerning is that although some bankruptcy courts 
have held that bad faith does not constitute cause for dismissal under 
§ 707(a) or have at least narrowed their bad faith inquiry, district 
courts have reversed their decisions and have reverted to applying a 
                                                 
 227. Id. at *3, *6.  Under § 521(a)(1), the debtor must file, inter alia, a list of 
creditors, and unless the court orders otherwise, a schedule of assets and liabilities, a 
schedule of current income and current expenditures, and a statement of financial 
affairs.  11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1) (2006). 
 228. In re Tiner, 2008 WL 2705103, at *2–3. 
 229. Id. at *3. 
 230. See Ohio ex rel. Celebrezze v. Commercial Oil Serv., Inc. (In re Commercial 
Oil Serv., Inc.), 58 B.R. 311, 318 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986) (dismissing the case for 
cause under § 707(a) for economical and expeditious removal of hazardous wastes to 
restore community safety and health); see also Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of 
Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 507 (1986) (granting dismissal under § 707(a) and 
holding that a trustee may not abandon property that was responsible for an 
environmental hazard because the trustee is responsible for bringing the property to 
a state that is in compliance with state and federal regulations, which are designed to 
protect the health and safety of the general public from identified hazards). 
 231. See In re RIS Inv. Group, Inc., 298 B.R. 848, 854 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2003) 
(finding that without factors including “a severe threat to public health, an abuse of 
the legal process, or some comparable extraordinary circumstances, a voluntary 
[c]hapter 7 business case should not be dismissed pursuant to [§ 707(a)]”). 
 232. See, e.g., In re Lombardo, 370 B.R. 506 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2007) (dismissing the 
bankruptcy petition under § 707(a) after conducting a bad faith inquiry for equitable 
reasons despite the fact that the debtor’s debt did not consist of “primarily consumer 
debts”). 
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totality of the circumstances analysis to grant bad faith dismissals.233  
In continuing this longstanding misapplication, these district courts 
have relied heavily on precedent and have continued to ignore, inter 
alia, congressional intent, legislative history, and the canons of 
statutory construction.234 
This problem is exemplified in In re Tallman,235 in which the 
bankruptcy court denied the creditor’s motion to dismiss under 
§ 707(a) because its “overall impression” indicated that the debtor 
was “ready, willing, and able” to satisfy the responsibilities of filing for 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy.236  Less than a year later, a district court 
reversed the bankruptcy court’s decision, stating that the bankruptcy 
court should have conducted a bad faith inquiry that considered the 
“totality of the circumstances.”237 
Although the bankruptcy court focused the § 707(a) analysis on 
the debtor’s honesty of purpose and on preserving the integrity of 
the bankruptcy system,238 it narrowed the bad faith inquiry in a 
number of ways.  First, the court noted that applying only multifactor 
tests is not particularly helpful because they risk diverting the court’s 
                                                 
 233. See, e.g., Sec. Am., Inc. v. Tallman (In re Tallman), No. 1:08-CV-309-TS, 2009 
WL 3245206, at *8 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2009), rev’g 397 B.R. 451 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 
2008) (reversing the bankruptcy court’s holding on the grounds that it failed to 
apply the totality of the circumstances analysis and disregarded facts and 
circumstances relevant to a bad faith analysis under § 707(a)); In re Pedigo, 296 B.R. 
485, 488–90 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2003), rev’d, United States v. Pedigo, 329 B.R. 47 (S.D. 
Ind. 2005) (upholding the principals of statutory construction and emphasizing the 
importance of maintaining a clear distinction between the objectives of each 
subsection in rejecting bad faith as cause for dismissal under § 707(a)). 
 234. See, e.g., Pedigo, 329 B.R. at 48–51, rev’g In re Pedigo, 296 B.R. 485 (Bankr. S.D. 
Ind. 2003) (rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s narrow reading of § 707(a) and citing a 
long string of cases that have upheld bad faith as a cause for dismissal).  The district 
court also stated that the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have not held that “the debtor’s 
motives in filing his Chapter 7 petition are irrelevant to the § 707(a) inquiry.”  Id. at 
49.  However, while distinguishing Chapter 7 cases from cases under Chapter 11 or 
13, the Ninth Circuit stated in In re Padilla that Chapter 7 bankruptcy “‘requires no 
ongoing relationship between the debtor and its creditors’ and should be available to 
any debtor willing to surrender all of its nonexempt assets, ‘regardless of whether the 
debtor’s motive in seeking such a remedy was grounded in good faith.’”  Neary v. Padilla  
(In re Padilla), 222 F.3d 1184, 1192–93 (9th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added) (citing 
Kimlinger & Wassweiler, supra note 15, at 65).  Although the Seventh Circuit had not 
addressed what constituted cause under § 707(a), the court justified its decision on 
the grounds that the Seventh Circuit has ruled that bad faith constitutes cause for 
dismissal of Chapter 13 cases under § 1307(c), a “parallel provision of § 707(a).”  
Pedigo, 329 B.R. at 49–50. 
 235. 397 B.R. 451 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2008), rev’d, No. 1:08-CV-309-TS, 2009 WL 
3245206 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2009). 
 236. Id. at 461.  The creditor was limited to bringing a motion to dismiss pursuant 
to § 707(a) because the debtor’s debt were not “primarily consumer debts.”  Id. at 
453 n.1. 
 237. In re Tallman, 2009 WL 3245206, at *8. 
 238. In re Tallman, 397 B.R at 453–54 (“Yet, one man’s trash can be another man’s 
treasure and bad faith, like beauty, is often in the eye of the beholder.”). 
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attention from the true purpose of the inquiry—whether or not cause 
exists to justify dismissal—to determining whether specific factors are 
present.239  Second, the court found inapplicable the creditor’s 
allegations that the debtor intended to use the bankruptcy process to 
discharge his largest debt, filed for bankruptcy in response to an 
arbitration award, and had the ability to pay a substantial portion of 
his debts.240  These were all factors that courts previously accepted in 
support of a finding of bad faith.241 
Additionally, the bankruptcy court gave no weight to the creditor’s 
argument that the timing of the filing was an abuse of the system by 
explaining that bankruptcy is often a debtor’s last resort that usually 
is not a consideration until no alternatives remain.242  Creditors can 
easily allege that the debtor filed for bankruptcy in bad faith and in 
response to their efforts to collect the outstanding debt.243  To avoid 
such allegations and the risk of dismissal, the debtor would be left to 
wait until the creditor has stopped taking action to file for 
bankruptcy.244 
In light of the bankruptcy court’s analysis, it is puzzling to see the 
district court revert to the totality of the circumstances analysis and 
grant dismissal for bad faith under § 707(a).  The district court 
concluded that the bankruptcy court failed to consider evidence 
including the debtor’s income and expenses, resulting in an unfair 
application of the totality of the circumstances analysis.245  In light of 
                                                 
 239. See id. at 454 (asserting that factor analyses are helpful only to a certain point, 
are more formulaic, and may not properly assess the circumstances surrounding 
each debtor’s unique situation as certain factors may draw a heavier focus than 
others); see also In re Kane & Kane, 406 B.R. 163, 167 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009) 
(recognizing that many factors applied by courts to determine whether the debtor 
acted in bad faith have little to no weight in cases under Chapter 7).  The court also 
stated that in applying the multifactor analyses, courts are “tallying the pluses and 
minuses” to determine the existence of bad faith, which they have yet to define or 
even articulate.  In re Tallman, 397 B.R. at 454. 
 240. In re Tallman, 397 B.R. at 457–58.  To all of the creditor’s arguments, the 
court responded, “This is true, but, so what?”  Id. 
 241. See, e.g., Perlin v. Hitachi Capital Am. Corp. (In re Perlin), 497 F.3d 364, 372 
(3d Cir. 2007) (holding that although a debtor’s inability to repay the debts alone is 
inadequate cause for dismissal, the court retains discretion to consider the debtor’s 
financial situation in a good faith analysis under § 707(a)); In re O’Brien, 328 B.R. 
669, 675 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2005) (applying a totality of the circumstances under 
§ 707(a) and, in its bad faith inquiry, considering a list of fourteen factors, which 
include whether the debtor petitioned for bankruptcy in response to a judgment 
pending litigation and whether the debtor’s use of bankruptcy protection causes 
“unconscionable detriment” to the creditors). 
 242. See In re Tallman, 397 B.R. at 457–58. 
 243. Id. at 458 n.5. 
 244. Id. 
 245. See Sec. Am., Inc. v. Tallman (In re Tallman), No. 1:08-CV-309-TS, 2009 WL 
3245206, at *6–8 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2009) (arguing that the bankruptcy court 
should have considered the evidence regarding the debtor’s ability to pay under the 
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the objective provision applied to justify dismissal, the court’s focus 
on reaching the most equitable outcome is understandable but 
troublesome because such a broad reading may create a slippery 
slope that would allow good faith and other principles of equity to be 
read into other objective provisions of the Code. 
However, in In re Sherman,246 the Ninth Circuit reversed the district 
court and upheld the bankruptcy court’s decision to deny the 
creditor’s motion to dismiss under § 707(a).247  In this case, the 
debtor, an attorney, represented a number of companies involved in 
a securities fraud action pursuant to a contingency fee agreement; 
the companies agreed to periodically pay the debtor advances against 
the contingency fee during the litigation.248  After settling the suits, 
the Receiver of the companies filed a motion seeking an order to 
require the debtor to disgorge the funds that he received and 
retained, but had not earned, through representing the companies.249  
Four days before the hearing, the debtor filed for bankruptcy 
protection,250 and the SEC subsequently filed a motion to dismiss.251 
In holding that the bankruptcy court did not err in denying the 
motion to dismiss, the court did not focus the § 707(a) inquiry on the 
existence of bad faith but narrowed it to determine whether there 
was cause for dismissal.252  As in In re Padilla, it found that other 
sections of the Code addressed each type of misconduct that the 
petitioner alleged and concluded that there was no cause to justify 
dismissal of the bankruptcy petition.253  If none of the Code provisions 
                                                 
totality of the circumstances and merely stating that “a majority of federal courts has 
determined that bad faith constitutes cause under § 707(a) and can justify 
dismissal”). 
 246. 491 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 247. Id. at 956. 
 248. Id. at 954.  Any money the debtor received that was in excess of his 
contingency fees was considered an interest-free loan.  Id.  A year before these 
proceedings, the debtor was also found in civil contempt for violating a court’s freeze 
order by withdrawing funds from the companies’ litigation trust account and was 
ordered to disgorge the funds withdrawn.  Id. 
 249. Id. at 954–55.  The Receiver settled the suits under the contingency fee 
agreement for $750,000, entitling the debtor to $300,000 in fees.  Id.  The district 
court granted the motion for disgorgement and ordered the debtor to pay 
$581,313.43—the difference between the $881,313.43 in advances the debtor 
collected and the actual fees the debtor earned for his representation.  Id. at 955. 
 250. Id. at 954. 
 251. Id. at 955. 
 252. Id. at 970. 
 253. Id. at 974.  The creditor alleged that the debtors: 
(1) “used the bankruptcy as a refuge from the district court’s jurisdiction, 
and to thwart [the creditor’s]” attempts at recovering the debt, (2) engaged 
in a “‘scorched earth’ tactic” against the creditor, and (3) “deliberately 
exaggerated their liabilities and expenses . . . to create the . . . impression 
that they were in dire . . . need of bankruptcy relief.” 
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addressed the type of misconduct alleged, the court would have 
considered whether the case could have been completely dismissed 
under the circumstances asserted.254 
Although the Ninth Circuit denied the motion to dismiss under 
§ 707(a), the creditor was not left unprotected or without remedy.  
The creditor simply sought to enforce its judgment under the wrong 
Code provision and failed to allege any debt-specific misconduct.255  
On remand, the court held that the debt was nondischargeable 
under § 523.256  Though the creditor and the court were frustrated 
with the debtor’s behavior before and during the bankruptcy 
proceedings, courts must carefully apply the Code and should neither 
read in provisions to achieve the most equitable remedy nor turn to 
the quickest and easiest remedy.257 
In sum, despite the increase in bankruptcy filings and the 
weakened but recovering economy, each debtor, including those who 
file remotely meritorious petitions, should receive a full hearing, and 
courts should not grant dismissals under § 707(a) at the petition 
stage unless the petition is procedurally unsound.258  By filing for 
                                                 
Id. at 970.  The court found that § 362, which recognizes that it is not always 
appropriate to allow debtors to take advantage of the automatic stay and allows a 
party in interest to challenge the imposition of the automatic stay, addressed the first 
alleged misconduct.  Id. at 971.  Next, § 547(b) addresses the “scorched earth” tactic 
and was enacted to prevent a debtor from favoring certain creditors by making pre-
petition transfers.  Id. at 972–73.  Section 727 addresses the last alleged misconduct 
and denies a debtor discharge if he misrepresented his liabilities and expenses to 
worsen the appearance of his situation.  Id. at 973. 
 254. See id. at 970 (explaining the two-part inquiry established in In re Padilla,  
222 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
 255. Id. at 975.  The court stated that the creditor was protected under 
§ 362(b)(4) and that the debtor was not subject to the automatic stay generally 
afforded to debtors in bankruptcy.  Id.  Additionally, the court found that the 
creditor could have avoided some of the debtor’s pre-petition transfers under § 547 
and could have prevented discharge under § 727 due to the debtor’s 
misrepresentations.  Id. 
 256. See SEC v. Sherman, 406 B.R. 883, 887 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (noting that the 
Ninth Circuit properly ordered the debtor “to make restitution of funds he obtained 
that were derived from a violation of federal securities laws, and that [§ 523(a)(19)] 
is available to the [creditor] for such violations”).  Section 523(a)(19) excepts 
discharge for debts incurred in violation of any federal or state securities laws or 
through fraud, deceit, or manipulation in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security within a specified time period.  11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19) (2006).   
The court emphasized the importance of maintaining the creditor’s ability to 
enforce the federal securities laws.  Sherman, 406 B.R. at 887. 
 257. See In re Sherman, 491 F.3d at 975 (“Padilla does not, however, permit a free-
floating concept of cause for dismissal to substitute for careful application of the 
bankruptcy scheme Congress devised, including the multitude of remedies for 
abusive behavior or behavior harmful to the public interest.”). 
 258. See In re Tallman, 397 B.R. 451, 457 & n.4 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2008), rev’d,  
No. 1:08-CV-309-TS, 2009 WL 3245206 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2009) (noting that the 
debt was too large for the debtor to be eligible for relief under Chapter 13). 
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Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the debtor has effectively thrown himself at 
the mercy of the bankruptcy court by relinquishing all claims to his 
property.259  Creditors and trustees have many other provisions to 
turn to under which they can move the court to deny discharge if the 
debtor has engaged in misconduct.260  Courts should take the final 
step and no longer recognize bad faith as a cause justifying dismissal 
of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition under § 707(a). 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the projected 1.45 to 1.5 million bankruptcy filings 
expected by the end of 2009,261 courts should not read in “bad faith” 
as cause for dismissal under § 707(a).  Although it is impossible to 
deny the existence of the increasing docket pressures that have 
resulted from the upsurge in bankruptcy petitions262 and the 
concomitant shortage of bankruptcy judgeships,263 those 
considerations cannot override the text, structure, or legislative 
purpose of the Code.  Perhaps to some, the debtor who incurred 
significant credit card debt from living a lavish lifestyle but recently 
underwent a costly medical procedure and lost his job deserves no 
relief and should be left to pay off his debt through his own means.  
But under the cases described above, it is possible that an “honest but 
unfortunate debtor” could be denied bankruptcy relief due to a 
cursory analysis of his overall financial situation that only considers 
the presence of certain factors to support a finding of bad faith. 
The sole concern of the court reviewing a motion to dismiss under 
§ 707(a) should be the debtor’s satisfaction of the technical and 
procedural requirements that fall within the objective scope of the 
                                                 
 259. See In re Kane & Kane, 406 B.R. 163, 170 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009) (emphasizing 
the consequences of denying a debtor access to bankruptcy relief); see also supra Part 
I.A (providing an overview of Chapter 7 bankruptcy); supra Part II.C (highlighting 
the differences between liquidation and reorganization, warranting different 
treatment for each type of bankruptcy). 
 260. See supra Part II.B (detailing some of the other Code provisions that creditors 
and trustees may turn to in order to petition the court to deny the debtor discharge 
of his debt). 
 261. Posting of Bob Lawless to Credit Slips, http://www.creditslips.org/ 
creditslips/2009/04/my-entry.html (April 2, 2009, 5:25 PM).  The rate of filings has 
almost returned to the level before the BAPCPA became effective.  Id. 
 262. Downturn Pushes More Toward Bankruptcy, AACER, 2007, http://aacer.com/ 
(follow “Press” tab and scroll to article). 
 263. Press Release, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Congress Is Urged to 
Add Bankruptcy Judgeships in the Face of Near-Record Case Levels (June 16, 2009), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/2009/BankruptcyJudgesips_0616.cfm; 
Press Release, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Bankruptcy Filings Continue 
to Increase, Records Broken for Total Filings and Non-Business Filings (May 15, 
2003), http://www.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/303bk.pdf. 
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section.264  Regardless of the apparent ineffectiveness of the BAPCPA 
in reducing the number of bankruptcy filings, Congress has 
maintained the objective nature of § 707(a) by repeatedly and 
intentionally omitting bad faith from the section.265  Although 
bankruptcy courts are courts of equity, they should abide by the 
provisions of the Code and should not decide a case based on what 
they subjectively conclude to be fair and just.266  Not only do other 
provisions of the Code afford protections to the bankruptcy system, 
but trustees will also bring enforcement actions to combat fraudulent 
and abusive filings.267  Courts need not and should not misconstrue 
§ 707(a) in order to protect the integrity of the bankruptcy system, 
and a filing done in bad faith should not automatically preclude a 
debtor from qualifying for bankruptcy relief. 
What remains is the need for consistency among court decisions 
concerning bad faith dismissals.268  This calls for clarification from the 
Supreme Court, or failing that, further amendments of the Code and 
the addition of more objective standards to clarify congressional 
                                                 
 264. See supra notes 41, 121, 128 and accompanying text (arguing that the 
application of § 707(a) should be limited to technical and procedural violations of 
the Code). 
 265. See supra note 102 and accompanying text; see supra Part II.A (emphasizing 
that Congress’ repeated and intentional omission of bad faith from § 707(a) should 
preclude any bad faith inquiry and should limit the court’s inquiry to the existence 
of violations of the enumerated technical and procedural causes for dismissal or 
violations within the objective scope of the section). 
 266. See supra note 175 and accompanying text (arguing that the function of the 
bankruptcy court, despite being a court of equity, is to interpret the Code and 
accurately apply its provisions without incorporating equitable considerations in the 
analysis). 
 267. See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES TRUSTEE PROGRAM 
ANNUAL REPORT (2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/public_affairs/ 
annualreport/docs/ar2008.pdf (detailing the investigations and actions brought by 
the United States Trustees against creditors, debtors, attorneys, and others involved 
in the bankruptcy process to prevent unwarranted discharge of debt and abusive 
conduct).  U.S. Trustees file motions to dismiss under § 707(b) if the debtor fails to 
rebut the presumption of abuse through a showing of special circumstances, and in 
the 2008 fiscal year, these filings prevented $374,854,825 from being discharged.   
Id. at 12.  They may also file complaints to deny discharge under § 727 if the debtor 
has engaged in improper conduct such as concealing assets or destroying property to 
hinder a creditor from recovery.  Id. at 11. 
 268. Another troubling fact is that the misinterpretation of § 707(a) is also 
contained in digests and sources that lawyers turn to for guidance for application of 
the laws.  See, e.g., 9A AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 1170 (2009) (stating that “[t]he 
application of equitable principles in determining whether good cause for dismissal 
exists is not precluded” and citing pre-BAPCPA cases upholding the implicit good 
faith filing requirement as support); 4 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 3D 
§ 79.4 (William L. Norton, Jr., 2009) (listing factors that courts considered in 
determining whether cause existed for dismissal, which included “whether the 
debtor is acting in good faith”).  The inaccuracies contained in these sources may be 
a contributing factor to the continued misapplication of the Code and improper 
dismissals of Chapter 7 cases.  See id. 
  
2010] THE CASE AGAINST “BAD FAITH” DISMISSALS 729 
intent, particularly with regard to the application of § 707(a).269  
Congress should set forth a clear distinction between the objective 
analysis under § 707(a) and subjective analysis under § 707(b).  
Although the discharge of debts through Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
should be limited to the “honest but unfortunate debtor,” § 707(a) 
should be strictly interpreted, and bad faith should not be considered 
an appropriate cause for dismissal. 
                                                 
 269. See generally Jean Braucher, A Fresh Start for Personal Bankruptcy Reform:   
The Need for Simplification and a Single Portal, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1295 (2006) 
(emphasizing the need for Congress to simplify the bankruptcy system and eliminate 
the burdens imposed on the debtors and stating that BAPCPA failed in achieving its 
goal of abuse prevention or consumer protection). 
